



**SOVIET VIEWS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST
ASIAN NATIONS: AN EXAMINATION OF UNCLASSIFIED
SOVIET SOURCES**

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Author: Dr. Jim Nichol

*Federal Research Division
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
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PREFACE

This study examines Soviet attitudes toward and relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) since its founding in 1967, focusing special attention on relations from 1980 to the present. The study examines the importance of ASEAN to Soviet strategic objectives in the South-east Asian region. The study considers Soviet commentary on US-ASEAN relations and Vietnam's role as the major Soviet proxy in the region. Because this study focuses on Soviet contacts, commentary, and activities which impinge upon and have elicited responses from ASEAN as an organization, it does not usually examine bilateral relations between the USSR and each ASEAN state or active measures and other covert activities aimed at the individual states. However, Soviet bilateral activities, if they elicit a coordinated response from more than one ASEAN state, are considered here as ASEAN-wide in context and are discussed.

This study is based exclusively on open-source information, particularly on Soviet media commentary. It is designed to match in form, and to update, Soviet Perceptions of the South Pacific and Antarctic Regions: An Examination of Unclassified Soviet Sources, DDE-2200-63-80 (July 1979), Chapter 5, Section 1, "ASEAN," pp. 53-68 (U).

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SUMMARY

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Brunei) has become increasingly active as a regional economic, political, and informal military organization. A major impetus to the vitalization of ASEAN has been the threat posed by the reunification of Vietnam and, more significantly, Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia. Vietnamese militarism in the region is generally seen by the ASEAN states as directly supported by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has greatly enhanced its presence and power projection capabilities in the region since the reunification of Vietnam, having established bases at Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay. The ASEAN states have generally opposed Soviet-Vietnamese expansionism, mainly through political-diplomatic means, although some military cooperation among the members of ASEAN is increasingly apparent.

The Soviets have used propaganda as a major instrument of influence in the ASEAN states. The Soviets use propaganda in an attempt to subvert ASEAN's official opposition to Soviet-Vietnamese expansionism, both by appealing to pro-Soviet factions within the ASEAN states and by attempting to exacerbate differences of opinion regarding the threat among the ASEAN states. The persistent Soviet propaganda effort to destroy ASEAN's stance against Soviet-Vietnamese expansionism takes the form of warning that the "real" danger to ASEAN is US and Chinese "hegemonism," and stressing that the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia is "fraternal assistance" to Cambodia. The Soviet Union and Vietnam have pushed the idea of a regional peace conference involving the conclusion of nonaggression treaties among the participants as a first stage toward the creation of a collective security arrangement in Asia.

1. INTRODUCTION

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), created in 1967, is composed of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Brunei (this latter state joined ASEAN in January 1984). ASEAN is of strategic interest to the Soviet Union because its members sit astride sea routes linking the European and Pacific regions of the Soviet Union and the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The Soviet projection of power into the region allows the Soviets to threaten cutoff of trade and military transit through the region in case of world conflict. The Soviet presence also serves to check Chinese ambitions there and to block Western attempts to foster peaceful economic and political development among the states of the region. Since the reunification of Vietnam in 1975 the Soviet presence in the region has greatly increased. The main problem that the USSR has in expanding its influence in the region is the continued anti-Soviet orientation of the ASEAN states. Following the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December, 1978, ASEAN's anti-Sovietism (and anti-communism) became stronger. The invasion halted tentative ASEAN diplomatic overtures toward Vietnam and increased ASEAN's military-political contacts with the West. Soviet diplomatic efforts since 1978 have focused on getting the ASEAN states to accede to Vietnamese control over Cambodia and to move to a more pro-Soviet (and by implication, anti-Western) political stance. Although the Soviet Union has not been very successful to date in achieving its goals regarding ASEAN, it has persistently attempted, through diplomatic overtures to individual ASEAN states and through subversion (not examined here in detail), to influence the overall policy orientation of ASEAN.

2. BACKGROUND: ASEAN'S INTERNAL STRUCTURE AND EXTERNAL SECURITY RELATIONS AND CONCERNS

a. Form and Composition of ASEAN

The human and material resources of the ASEAN states, and the location of the states astride navigable straits and sea lanes, make them economically and militarily important to the developed countries. The ASEAN states possess a combined population of almost 300 million, well developed manufacturing/industrial/banking sectors, and ample natural resources such as tin (Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia are the world's three largest producers), rubber (Malaysia is the world's largest producer), copper, petroleum, natural gas, bauxite, nickel, and forestry/agricultural products (Thailand is one of the world's largest exporters of rice). The strategic ocean straits, connecting the Pacific and Indian Oceans, include the Bali, Luzon, Lombok, Makassar, Malacca/Singapore (hereafter simply referred to as Malacca), Ombi-Wetar, and Sunda straits. The geographical location of the states, in an area where the US, USSR, and China have strategic interests, has made the ASEAN states vulnerable to attempts at outside influence.

The first two post-WW II Southeast Asian regional precursors of ASEAN were the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), a political-economic association formed in July 1961 and composed of Malaya, the Philippines, and Thailand; and the "Greater Malay Federation" (Maphilindo), a loose federation formed in July-August 1963 and composed of Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia.¹ Although these two associations were short-lived, they paved the way for the formation of ASEAN in August 1967, with the signing of the Bangkok

Declaration. The goals of ASEAN set forth in the Declaration are "to accelerate economic growth, social progress, and cultural development through joint endeavors. . . ." The Declaration also called for nonalignment in international relations. Since the founding of ASEAN, its nature has been further defined by agreements and declarations often formulated in response to dangers to regional security. For instance, shortly after the British military withdrawal from the region in November 1971, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers endorsed a proposal for the establishment of a "Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality" (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia.² However, disagreement over the nature of ZOPFAN has foreclosed its acceptance.

b. ASEAN States' Security Commitments

In dealing with the major perceived threats to the region--Vietnam, the USSR, and China--the ASEAN states have relied on their own national military forces, security agreements among the ASEAN states, and on security agreements with major noncommunist powers. The reliance on one's own national forces for security received official ASEAN sanction in 1976 as the concept of national resilience. This concept, originally developed by the Indonesians but endorsed by the ASEAN member-states, was described by Indonesian President Suharto as the ability of an ASEAN member state to develop economically and politically while maintaining its own security against external threats.³ The concept of national resilience skirted the issue of formal defense cooperation among the ASEAN states, still a sensitive issue among states which in the recent past engaged in military operations against one another. This concept of national resilience, basically a concept of self-defense which tolerates both intra-and extra-ASEAN security commitments of the member states, was embodied in the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, signed at the February, 1976 summit meeting of the ASEAN heads of state.⁴ The concept of national resilience remains today the official approach of ASEAN toward security, although there is an increasing de facto trend in the 1980s toward greater integrated regional defense cooperation.

Besides the call for national resilience, the ASEAN states moved to strengthen their political-economic cooperation. At the 1976 summit meeting the heads of state discussed the ASEAN response to the North Vietnamese takeover of South Vietnam. They decided to meet the Vietnamese threat by revitalizing the structure of ASEAN to facilitate political and economic cooperation. A permanent Secretariat was set up in Jakarta, and several documents which institutionalized political and economic cooperation among the member states were drawn up. They also agreed that ASEAN would not formally involve itself in military cooperation, but that the individual member states could continue bilateral efforts to combat insurgency.⁵

Security cooperation among the ASEAN states has traditionally taken the form of bilateral border security agreements. In the 1970s, Indonesia and Malaysia, and Malaysia and Thailand, coordinated counterinsurgency efforts against the Malaysian Communist Party. In 1976 Thailand and Malaysia and Indonesia and Malaysia formally entered into border agreements which called for joint military action against insurgency. In 1977 agreements were concluded between Thailand and the Philippines, the Philippines and Singapore, and Thailand and Malaysia for the exchange of defense intelligence and for the holding of periodical meetings to discuss the problem of insurgency and

subversion. Maritime security agreements have also been concluded to control smuggling, gunrunning, and piracy in the Strait of Malacca.

The ASEAN states have also individually entered into security guarantees with major noncommunist powers. These external security commitments include: the Five-Power Defense Arrangement (ANZUK) linking Australia, New Zealand, Britain, Malaysia, and Singapore, signed in 1971; the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, signed in 1951; and the US-Thailand Executive Agreement, termed the Rusk-Thanat Statement of 1962. The US is also indirectly involved in ASEAN security as the 1951 signatory of the Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand, and the US (ANZUS); because Australia and New Zealand are members of ANZUK, US guarantees of their security affect ASEAN security. In the period since the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, the ASEAN states have also come to rely, at least indirectly, on Chinese support against Vietnamese expansionism, a posture which is disconcerting to some ASEAN states fighting ethnic-Chinese (and, at least formerly, China-supported) insurgency.⁶

China and Vietnam have long competed for better relations with ASEAN, but the Chinese were the first to perceive ASEAN as an ally. In 1973 China began overtures to ASEAN but until 1977-1978 Vietnam denounced the organization as US-controlled. China has urged a continued Western, and US, military presence in the ASEAN states, although it has also unreservedly endorsed the ZOPFAN proposal. Endorsement of ZOPFAN may either represent Chinese support for any proposal which might keep Soviet influence from increasing in the region or may represent China's long-term goal--the elimination of all major powers from the region. In either event, the Chinese border attack against Vietnam in 1979 and Chinese public statements of support for ZOPFAN have helped to dissuade Vietnam from further military expansion into Southeast Asia. In these roles, then, China serves as a security guarantor for ASEAN.⁷

c. Perceived Threats to ASEAN Security

The signing of the Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship and Cooperation Treaty in November 1978 and the subsequent Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia halted tentative ASEAN efforts to establish closer relations with the Hanoi government. Most ASEAN states perceive that some sort of cooperative relationship with Vietnam could evolve in the future, given both Vietnam's geographical membership in the Southeast Asian community of states and its economic needs. Until recently, however, Vietnamese militancy has discouraged the ASEAN states from establishing normal relations with Vietnam. Only if Vietnam withdraws from Cambodia, asserts an independent (i.e., non-Soviet) foreign policy, and halts anti-ASEAN rhetoric could trade and diplomatic relations with the ASEAN countries become reality.

The assessment of the respective Soviet, Vietnamese, and Chinese threats to ASEAN differs among the ASEAN states. Indonesia and Malaysia, both with large, unassimilated Chinese minorities, fear Chinese-sponsored insurgency and long-term ambitions, while Thailand and Singapore fear Vietnamese (and Soviet-sponsored) threats to their security. The Filipinos perceive the Soviets as more threatening than the Vietnamese. Indonesians have played down the immediate Soviet threat to the region and have stressed the need for a balanced policy toward the US and USSR.⁸ Malaysians and Indonesians have favored solutions to the Cambodian problem which may leave some Vietnamese

control (such as establishment of a client regime), while Thais, Singaporeans, and Filipinos have favored complete Vietnamese withdrawal of influence from Cambodia.⁹ Thailand has traditionally feared Vietnamese expansionism, and the fall of Saigon to North Vietnam in 1975 and events since that time have only accentuated traditional Thai apprehensions.¹⁰ Thailand has sought Chinese support in insuring its security. In May 1984, a Thai military delegation headed by General Arthit Kamlang-ek, Supreme Military Commander, met with Zhao Ziyang and PLA Chief of Staff Yang Dezhi. Negotiations were said to have resulted in an arms sales agreement which may include the supply of Chinese MiG-21s to Thailand. Later in 1984, Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila also led a delegation to Beijing. The Thai rapprochement with China was supported by the May 1984 meeting of the ASEAN foreign ministers. Malaysia has also begun to improve relations with Beijing, sending former Foreign Minister Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie to Beijing in June 1984. Other ASEAN states oppose rapprochement with China. For example, the Philippines and China jointly claim islands belonging to the Spratly Archipelago.¹¹

The close Soviet relationship with Vietnam has constrained Soviet efforts to increase its influence among the ASEAN states, although the various ASEAN states differ in their assessment of the dangers of the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance. In particular, Thailand has traditionally opposed Vietnamese geostrategic ambitions in Indochina. The Thais strongly condemned the invasion of Cambodia, indicating that "they are not willing to tolerate the projection of Vietnamese power into the whole of the Trans-Mekong area, especially when the projection of that power is supported by an external actor--itself perceived to be a potential threat--that is, the Soviet Union."¹² Soviet economic and military support for Vietnam amounts to several million dollars a day, and "this and this alone enables Hanoi to continue its occupation of [Cambodia]."¹³ Thai Deputy Prime Minister Thanat Khoman has stated that, "It is as clear as daylight that if the [occupation and border] war goes on, it is because of the support and assistance from the USSR itself."¹⁴ The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and growing Soviet economic-military activities in Vietnam have led the Thais to perceive the Cambodian invasion as part of Soviet global ambitions. The Thais also have expressed concern over the increasing activities of the Thai-based Moscow-line "Green Star" Communist Party and over the basing, in Soviet Siberia, of Soviet SS-20 IRBMs which directly threaten Thai territory. A Thai elite survey found that 96% of Thai elite members consider the Soviet Union a threat in three areas: subversion; support of military aggression against Thailand by use of proxy states; and destruction of ASEAN.¹⁵

Soviet subversion through local communist parties is a particularly serious problem in the Philippines. The Soviets support both the traditional pro-Soviet Philippine Communist Party (PKP) and the much larger Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP-ML). The PKP has recently followed a policy of eschewing harsh criticism of the Marcos government. The CPP-ML, on the other hand, is dedicated to the armed overthrow of Marcos through its military arm, the National People's Army (NPA). The CPP-ML has stated that it had over 30,000 members at the beginning of 1984 and that its military arm, the NPA, had 20,000 members. The NPA is heavily involved in urban insurgency and assassinations and has control over large rural areas. With its increasing numbers, the NPA has become involved in conventional battles with the Philippine Army.¹⁶

3. GENERAL SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Soviet interest in state-to-state relations in Southeast Asia began in earnest only after Stalin's death in 1953. In contrast, early Soviet interest in revolution in Asia can be dated from Stalin's revolutionary article "Don't Forget the East," written in 1918, and proclamations of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in 1947. Before Stalin's death, the Soviet themes of constructing "socialism in one country" and (after World War II) the "Two Camps" doctrine dominated Soviet thinking, and hence led to the relative neglect of opportunities for advancement in the third world through formal, state-to-state channels. Instead, subversion and military force were the main methods used to advance Soviet goals in the third world. Several communist insurrections occurred in Southeast Asia in 1948-1950, at least partially instigated by support from the newly formed Cominform and by the revolutionary rhetoric of the Soviet-sponsored Asian Youth Conference held in Calcutta in early 1948.¹⁷ For instance, after the head of the CP of Burma had returned from Calcutta, in March 1948 insurrection broke out in several areas of Burma. In Malaya a "peoples' revolutionary war" was started by the Malayan CP in 1948. In the Philippines the Hukbalahap (Huks) launched all-out civil war at the end of 1949. An uprising of communists took place in Indonesia in September 1948.¹⁸ In Vietnam, the Vietnamese intensified their armed struggle in 1948 and extended their influence into Cambodia and Laos in 1949.¹⁹ Major examples of other communist hostile actions in the late 1940s and early 1950s include the Soviet-backed North Korean invasion of South Korea and Soviet meddling in the Civil War in China.

In 1956 at the 20th Party Congress Khrushchev formulated his theory of the "zone of peace," which replaced the earlier "two camps" thesis. The "zone of peace" encompassed the ex-colonies and other independent states of the Third World which were said to be on the road to socialism. One of the major indicators of Soviet interest in Asia was the Soviet-supported Bandung Conference, held in 1955 to encourage national liberation movements in the Third World. In Southeast Asia the Soviet Union became active in supplying military equipment and propaganda support to the Vietnamese after 1954 and to Sukarno of Indonesia during 1959-1965. In the 1960s the Soviet Union became Vietnam's arms supplier. In 1969 Brezhnev proposed that the Asian states form an Asian Collective Security System. These and many other Soviet initiatives involving Southeast Asia reveal the increased Soviet strategic interest in the region.²⁰

At present the Soviet Union has five interrelated objectives in Southeast Asia: (1) to supplant US influence in the region by moving into the power vacuum created after the US withdrew from Vietnam in 1973; (2) to contain China by establishing a cordon sanitaire of Soviet client states around it; (3) to prevent ASEAN from becoming a powerful regional security grouping and to reduce the effectiveness of the tripartite Pacific Security Treaty alliance (ANZUS), Manila Pact, and the Five-Power Defense Pact (ANZUK) in preventing Soviet advancement; (4) to maintain and increase Soviet influence over Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and to protect these client states from internal/external threats; and (5) to consolidate and increase Soviet naval and air power projection capabilities in the region for the purpose of containing China, protecting Vietnam, and establishing control over vital sea straits linking the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean.²¹ The Soviet Union uses a variety of means to accomplish these objectives, including propaganda,

diplomatic, military, economic, and cultural means. Propaganda is disseminated through radio broadcasts beamed at Southeast Asia and through local newspapers subsidized by the Soviet Union. Diplomatic overtures include the attempt to set up an "Asian Collective Security System" dominated by the Soviet Union. Military means include establishment of air and naval bases at Cam Ranh Bay and holding of joint military exercises in the South China Sea with Vietnam. Economic overtures include attempts to increase trade ties with ASEAN. Lastly, the Soviets have established cultural and scientific exchange programs with some of the ASEAN states.

The military expansion of the Soviet Union has included a role for a global, "blue-water" navy. In pursuing the goal of a blue-water navy the Soviets have established naval bases worldwide and have demanded the right to transit international straits without hindrance. Soviet commentary has indicated a great Soviet concern that ASEAN might become closely aligned with South Korea, Japan, and Australia, thereby pooling their naval forces and effectively blocking Soviet naval passage through the Malacca Strait and Indonesian straits. As one Western analyst explains, "Such a naval ring would be a most effective naval defense system, in fact completely stalemating the Soviet navy in Southeast and Northeast Asian waters. This would pose a strategic threat to Moscow's capability to defend the Soviet Far East and Siberia."²²

The Malacca Strait is particularly important to the Soviets. The deepest of the straits, it allows the shortest and quickest transit between the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. The littoral states--Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore--possess fast patrol craft, Exocet and Gabriel antiship missiles, and torpedo-firing submarines. Hence the littoral ASEAN states have a significant sea denial capability over the eastern and western approaches to the Malacca Strait. In countering the ASEAN defense efforts, the Soviets have moved to insure their free access through the Malacca and other Southeast straits by petitioning the United Nations to insure that the straits are considered international waters, and by constantly attempting to sabotage regional defense cooperation. For instance, Soviet propaganda about the Five-Power Defense Arrangement (ANZUK) illustrates the Soviet goal of splitting up the organization. Similarly, the Soviets constantly warn that defense cooperation among the ASEAN states plays into the hands of the West and China. Active steps which the Soviets have taken to ensure their access to, if not control over, the straits include use of Cam Ranh Bay as the major source for power projection into Southeast Asia, with the subsidiary use of Kompong Son for naval and air power projection. Along with the major Soviet base on Socotra Island off the coast of the PDRY, the Soviets have achieved potential control over major straits and waterways leading to and from the Indian Ocean.

4. SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF AND SECURITY OVERTURES TOWARD ASEAN

a. ASEAN as Perceived Through Marxist-Leninist Ideology

According to Marxism-Leninism, ASEAN represents an anticolonial grouping of developing countries (all but Thailand are ex-colonies and even Thailand is held to have been a vassal-state of Great Britain). In these states the low-level native colonial administrators assumed power upon national independence. These native administrators formed the basis of a new national

bourgeoisie. In the case of the ASEAN countries, the ruling bourgeoisie formed ASEAN in order to thwart revolution by the national working classes and to preserve Western military/economic/political ties which were endangered when the British announced their military withdrawal from the region in the late 1960s. In other words, the ASEAN states' bourgeoisie collude with the world bourgeoisie. As one Soviet text states, the transition to independence and national development in the ASEAN states "was accompanied. . . by focusing real power in the hands of one person (the authoritarian form of rule) or a narrow circle of persons, who represents the pinnacle of the military and/or large industrial-banking bourgeoisie, [simultaneously with the] the reduction or restriction of bourgeois-democratic freedoms, the intensification and expansion of the social base of opposition--the right and the left--[and the linking of the state to foreign capital.]"²³ According to one Soviet writer, political cooperation was central to ASEAN's formation, although ostensibly the association was formed to further economic and cultural cooperation. The primary political reason for establishing ASEAN was the safeguarding of internal national security in order to preserve "ideological- and class-kindred regimes and [to] secur[e] the interests and positions of the ruling circles."²⁴

According to the Soviets, after the Bali Summit of February 1976 ASEAN strengthened ties with the United States. The leaders of ASEAN, faced with socialist victory in Vietnam, wished to contain socialist Vietnam and crush the national liberation movements in the region.²⁵ The Diplomatic Dictionary, edited by Andrei Gromyko, notes that ASEAN is under undisguised pressure from the USA and other countries, which hope to impart on the association an anti-socialist orientation, to urge them into confrontation with Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and to convert ASEAN into a military-political grouping.²⁶

b. The Soviet Asian Collective Security Proposal and ASEAN

The "Asian collective security" proposal reflects the Soviet goal of securing recognition of its status as an Asian power by Asian states and winning a general acceptance of the occupation of Cambodia. The proposed alliance system is primarily directed against China.²⁷ Leonid Brezhnev cryptically mentioned the Soviet proposal for a "system of collective security for Asia" in a speech to the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' parties delivered in Moscow on 7 June 1969. A month before Brezhnev's proposal, a Soviet correspondent wrote that the decision by Prime Minister Harold Wilson in January, 1968 to evacuate British military bases east of the Suez Canal, "paves the way for the laying of the foundations of collective security" in Asia.²⁸ The details of the Soviet plan remained vague, however. In the December 1970 issue of SOVIET LAND Mikhail S. Kapitsa, Chief of the First Far Eastern Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, admitted that "no one can, of course, say concretely today how the system of collective security in Asia can be set up and what form it should take. Collective security will be the fruit. . . of joint searchings of Asian countries." Kapitsa did state that such a system would not be a military bloc but rather would constitute a loose economic/scientific/political confederation. No mention was made by Kapitsa of the need for defense against outside aggressors.²⁹

In March 1972, Brezhnev elaborated on his proposal for a collective security system, stating that "collective security in Asia, as we see it, should be based on such principles as renunciation of the use of force in relations among states, respect of sovereignty and inviolability of borders, noninterference in internal affairs, extensive development of economic and other cooperation on the basis of full equality and mutual advantage." Brezhnev juxtaposed his idea of collective security to the formation of "military blocs and groupings" in the region, but did not really spell out how the collective security arrangement would differ from a military alliance.³⁰

In the 6 June 1972 issue of SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW, Novosti military commentator Svyatoslav Kozlov added to Brezhnev's description of collective security, stressing that such a system would be outside UN control and would involve setting up a regional executive body and the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral security agreements among the prospective members. Kozlov clarified the nature of the security system when he proposed that such an organization should renounce the use of force, should disarm, and should declare itself a nuclear-free zone. He implied that in the interim period before disarmament, if outside aggression occurred the member states could take military action.³¹

The Soviets have attempted to incorporate the scheme of Asian collective security into bilateral agreements which they have concluded with Asian states as a "first step" toward multilateral agreements. However, India resisted inclusion of the scheme in its Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with the Soviet Union concluded in August 1971, although the treaty does mention the mutual desire for peace in Asia. In the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of December 1978, Article 8 pledges the parties to "creation of an effective security system in Asia." Article 5 of the Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship Treaty, signed in November 1978, called for peace and cooperation among the peoples of Southeast Asia. In the period since Brezhnev's death, the Soviets verbally deemphasized the collective security system and instead shifted their propaganda campaign to extol the establishment of a "zone of peace" in Southeast Asia. Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Mongolia all endorsed the Soviet "zone of peace" proposal and presented basically identical variants of the Soviet proposal. They also claimed that their proposals are similar to ASEAN's proposal for a "zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality" (ZOPFAN).

The proposal for an Asian collective security system received new support when Gorbachev became General Secretary. In May 1985 Gorbachev proposed such a system during the Moscow visit of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Gorbachev, after mentioning the Indian proposal for an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace, the Mongolian proposal for a convention on the non-use of force in Asia, the Chinese pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, added that "is it not advisable, considering all of these initiatives . . . to think of a common, comprehensive approach to the problem of security in Asia and a possible pooling of efforts by Asian states in this direction? . . . Here different methods are evidently possible--bilateral talks and multilateral consultations--up to holding at some point in the future an All-Asian Forum . . ."³²

5. SOVIET APPROACHES TOWARD ASEAN

a. Brief History of Soviet-ASEAN Relations from 1967 to 1980

Until recently, ASEAN has been a low priority in Soviet foreign policy. When ASEAN was founded in 1967, the Soviet Union had diplomatic relations with only two of the members, Indonesia and Thailand, and these relations were merely pro forma. At the time, Suharto was overseeing the repression of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), which only two years before had attempted a takeover. Thai territory sheltered US military bases used to fight against North Vietnam, and Soviet propaganda labelled the Thai leaders as reactionaries who served the cause of American imperialism.³³ When ASEAN was founded, the Soviet Union condemned it as simply another US military alliance.³⁴ After ASEAN declared support for the establishment of ZOPFAN in late 1971, Soviet commentary praised the links between ZOPFAN and the Soviet plan for an Asian Collective Security System, but noted that ZOPFAN could not be established as long as Western military bases and alliances existed in the region. ZOPFAN was also perceived by the Soviets as a response by the ASEAN states to the Vietnamization policy being pursued by the US and the regional power vacuum being created as a result. By declaring the region a ZOPFAN, the ASEAN states hoped to prevent China and Japan from moving into the power vacuum, the Soviet media explained.³⁵ According to one Western writer, Soviet commentary on ASEAN was generally positive from 1972 through 1976 (the period when the US wound down its military operations in Vietnam). From late 1976 till late 1977 Soviet commentary took a more negative stance, responding to ASEAN efforts to increase their military preparedness in the face of continued Vietnamese militarism in Indochina. However, since 1978, Soviet propaganda has adopted a generally positive stance. The reason for this positive stance is due to Soviet desires "to compete with Beijing for favorable relations with the states of ASEAN," and to encourage the states to adopt an anti-Western orientation.³⁶ The post-1977 Soviet propaganda line regarding ASEAN has been that, although the West and China try to include ASEAN in an anti-Soviet military alliance, the leaders of the ASEAN states should resist these overtures. Even after the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and ASEAN reaction to the invasion (including ASEAN's sponsorship of the resolution in the UN Security Council calling for Vietnam to withdraw its forces from Cambodia), Soviet commentators took great pains to avoid direct attacks against the leaders of the ASEAN states, instead attributing anti-Soviet and anti-Vietnamese activities by the states to "outside pressure" (i.e., US and Chinese pressure).³⁷ This propaganda stance has continued to the present.

Because the Soviet Union has no ties with ASEAN as an organization, and has minimal trade, educational/scientific/cultural exchange, or arms assistance relations with the individual ASEAN states, the Soviets have had to rely on active measures, including propaganda and covert activities such as support for subversion, as the main instruments of influencing the foreign policy activities of the ASEAN states. The Soviets have attempted to persuade the ASEAN states that there are no Soviet and Vietnamese threats to the region, and have constantly reiterated that the West and China are the greatest threats to the region. The propaganda goal is to achieve rapprochement between the Soviet bloc (including communist Indochina) and the ASEAN states and to loosen ties of the ASEAN states with the West, while at the same time preventing China from increasing influence in the region.

Following the fall of South Vietnam to North Vietnamese forces in 1975, ASEAN became more active as an organization. In February 1976, the first summit of the ASEAN heads of government was held at Bali, and in August 1977 the second summit was held at Kuala Lumpur, during which the ASEAN states made important strides in increasing the cohesiveness and momentum of the organization. By 1978 the increased regional importance of the organization made it a target of intensified Soviet, Chinese, and communist Indochinese influence attempts. A series of visits to the ASEAN states took place: Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong visited all five ASEAN countries; Chinese Deputy Prime Minister Deng Xiaoping visited Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore; and Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Iang Sary and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolai Firubin visited several of the ASEAN states. The ASEAN states coordinated their responses to the visits, especially to that of Pham Van Dong, when each ASEAN government issued nearly identical communique on his visit.³⁸ The Soviets also toned down rhetoric warning that relations with the US, Japan, and China were turning the organization into a military bloc.³⁹ These Soviet-Vietnamese attempts to convince the ASEAN states of their peaceful intentions were ineffective in the face of the conclusion of the Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship and Cooperation Treaty in November 1978, which was soon followed by the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December. In January 1979, the ASEAN foreign ministers held a special meeting in Bangkok and strongly condemned the Vietnamese invasion, calling for the withdrawal of foreign forces from the country.

b. Soviet Contacts With and Commentary On ASEAN in the 1980s

Soviet relations with and perceptions of ASEAN are strongly colored by ASEAN's relations with China and the Western powers, particularly with the US. During the time period under review, the Soviets have generally taken the position that ASEAN itself is a positive development in the historical struggle against imperialism, but that constant attempts are made by Western and Japanese imperialists and Chinese hegemonists to subvert the association. Hence much Soviet commentary about ASEAN attributes anti-Soviet policies to manipulation by imperialism and hegemonism rather than to the association itself. Another technique the Soviets use to indirectly criticize ASEAN policies is to attribute criticism to third parties. For instance, criticisms of the communiques issued at the annual ASEAN foreign ministers' Conferences are often attributed either to the communist Indochinese states or to newspapers and personalities in the ASEAN states. The exception to indirect Soviet criticism of ASEAN policies is the increasingly direct criticism of Thailand, which the Soviets see as becoming one of the main US-Chinese bases for anti-Soviet and anti-Vietnamese activities.

Although Soviet propaganda themes concerning ASEAN differ in response to current events, over the time period covered by this study seven constant themes stand out. These themes are: (1) the US and other states are trying to turn ASEAN into a military-political bloc allied with NATO, ANZUS, or encompassed in the "superbloc" Pacific Community; (2) the US and other capitalist states are attempting to economically subvert ASEAN through penetration by transnational corporations, financial entanglements, and unfair trade practices; (3) the US wants to base weapons and troops in ASEAN so that the region can serve as a base for power projection into the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf; (4) the US wants to create a cordon sanitaire or "eastern front" around

the USSR in order to contain and threaten it; (5) the US wants to base nuclear weapons in Western Europe and the ASEAN states in order to make them "nuclear hostages" which will be expendable in the case of nuclear war and will (the US hopes) remove the brunt of retaliation away from the US mainland; (6) the US wants to reestablish its military presence in Southeast Asia so that it can reinvade and retake Indochina; (7) the US and China are forming an "axis" (with subsidiary members including South Korea and Japan) for military-political control over the Pacific and Southeast Asian regions.

(1) Soviet (and Communist Indochinese) Contacts With and Commentary on ASEAN During 1980

(a) Overview

The major Soviet overture toward ASEAN during 1980 dealt with attempts to prevent the convening of an ASEAN-sponsored international conference dealing with the invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam. Also, the Soviets criticized other ASEAN measures to isolate Vietnam internationally. Soviet propaganda stressed that US and Chinese pressure was responsible for the ASEAN stance on the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. In an attempt to blunt ASEAN's anti-Vietnam initiatives and at the same time to foster schism within ASEAN, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolai Firyubin visited Thailand and Singapore and pushed the communist Indochinese (and Soviet) proposal that Vietnam sign nonaggression pacts with each of the ASEAN states (rather than with ASEAN as an organization). This bilateral approach plays upon the varying perceptions of the immediate Vietnamese threat among the ASEAN members.

(b) Commentary

On the eve of the period under review, on 14 November 1979, the UN General Assembly overwhelmingly approved an ASEAN-sponsored resolution for convening an international conference to deal with the status of Cambodia. In mid-December 1979, the ASEAN foreign ministers held an informal meeting in Kuala Lumpur to condemn Vietnamese violations of the Thai border and to support Thailand's request to the UN Secretary General that UN observers be sent to the border region to help safeguard Thailand's borders. In commenting on the ASEAN moves against Vietnamese expansionism, the Soviets merely noted that "hostile remarks" against the communist Indochinese nations had been made "at fairly high official levels" in the ASEAN states, maintaining the indirect line of Soviet criticism. ASEAN was warned that hostility toward communist Indochina played into the hands of Beijing and Washington. The Soviets noted with approval that "realistic circles" within the ASEAN states, particularly circles in Indonesia and Malaysia, advocated the widening of contacts between ASEAN and communist Indochina.⁴⁰ Another Soviet commentator in January 1980 ambiguously asserted that the US and China had hoped to jointly rule over communist Indochina but that the victory of Vietnam foiled these plans. The commentator also asserted that the US and China had threatened to overthrow the Chomanan government of Thailand if it did not support the Pol Pot "gang." The commentator went on to assert that the other militantly anti-Soviet member of ASEAN--Singapore--wanted China to control Southeast Asia because 75 percent of the population of Singapore were ethnic Chinese, "who maintain traditional links with the mainland." The commentator implicitly praised the rebuff Thailand and Singapore received from the more moderate ASEAN states--Malaysia and

Indonesia--at the ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting held in December 1979, when the foreign ministers took a moderate tone, declaring neutrality in the Vietnamese-Chinese conflict and restraint in support of the "doomed" Pol Pot gangs.⁴¹

In February 1980, US Assistant Secretary of State for South-east Asian and Pacific Affairs R. Holbrooke toured the ASEAN states. According to Soviet commentary, he visited the states to get them to increase their imports of US arms. Holbrooke was also said by the Soviets to be concerned with convincing those ASEAN states which did not already have bilateral agreements on military cooperation with the US to join in a "new SEATO" based on the "resurrection" of the Manila Treaty. The Philippines and Indonesia had already rebuffed these US plans, the Soviets reported.⁴²

In early March 1980, representatives of the European Economic Community (EEC) met with the ASEAN foreign ministers to work out means for the EEC nations to "increase their economic penetration of the region," according to Soviet commentary. The goal of the ASEAN states in increasing their ties with the EEC was said by the Soviets to be the prevention of such penetration by the US and Japan. However, these ASEAN efforts to reduce US influence only partially succeeded, since the representatives decided to support a US-dictated economic boycott of Vietnam. Although ASEAN endorsed this economic boycott, the Foreign Minister of Malaysia denounced it and called for a settlement of political differences between ASEAN and communist Indochina. Other anti-Soviet, anti-Vietnamese, and anti-Cambodian proposals made by the EEC representatives were not endorsed by the ASEAN states, which continued to resist their absorption into a Western military-political organization according to the Soviets.⁴³

In mid-March the Singaporean Senior Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, S. Dhanabalan, announced that Singapore would not service Soviet naval vessels or military planes, or allow overflights of Singapore. Although in the past Singapore had allowed Soviet auxiliary ships to come to Singapore for repairs, Soviet-Vietnamese expansionism dictated that Singapore take a hard line against such assistance. He added that although Singapore saw both the USSR and China as threats, the USSR, in league with Vietnam, is the greater threat. However, he stated, the Soviets are trying not to overtly alienate ASEAN because such a policy would only drive ASEAN toward cooperation with China. Dhanabalan warned Vietnam that, according to Soviet ideology, "there is no such concept as . . . independence . . . those who have received the kiss of the Soviet treaty of friendship [should] ponder over this . . . the kiss of death." He also called on the free world to resist the Soviets "at every turn."⁴⁴

In March 1980, Indonesian President Suharto and Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Hussein Onn met in Kuantan, Malaysia, and devised a proposal which called for Vietnam to reduce its ties to the Soviet Union in exchange for ASEAN pressure on China to reduce its forces along the Vietnamese border. This "Kuantan initiative" was designed to reduce the major-power presence in the region, including Chinese influence in Thailand. It included ASEAN recognition of the Heng Samrin regime in Cambodia in exchange for the Vietnamese withdrawal of its troops from Cambodia and the repatriation of Cambodian refugees from Thailand. Suharto and Onn thought that the major

threats to Thailand were increasing Chinese influence and a worsening economy. The repatriation of the refugees was seen as a way to improve the economic situation. Thailand and the US did not back the "Kuantan initiative" because it would have sanctioned the consolidation of Vietnam's control over Indochina, effectively making Thailand the buffer state between Vietnam and the rest of ASEAN, and would have made Thailand increasingly vulnerable to Vietnamese-backed insurgency launched from Cambodia and Laos.⁴⁵

In mid-1980 the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) adopted a resolution on convening an international conference to examine the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. In response to this, Pravda reported that "certain circles in ASEAN," (specifically, the US and China) were behind the resolution. The official TASS report condemning the resolution did not mention ASEAN, however.⁴⁶ Soviet commentary stepped up criticism of US "pressure" on ASEAN, stating that "the US desire to deploy its naval forces in this region is certainly not the result of concern for its own or its allies' national interests but of fear of further evolution of progressive transformations in Iran and Afghanistan and the American monopolies' fear of losing access to Near East oil and of the Pentagon's losing important strategic positions in that region." These US fears have also led to proposals to create a "Pacific Community," including the countries of ASEAN, which would be nothing more than a resurrected SEATO, in order to contain socialism in communist Indochina.⁴⁷

In late August a special session of ASEAN, held in Manila, adopted a resolution to support the preservation of the Khmer Rouge seat in the United Nations. Soviet TASS commentator Bulantsev reminded the ASEAN states that "fanning up mistrust and hostility toward the popular regime" in Cambodia contradicted the ASEAN states' profession of wanting to make Southeast Asia a "zone of peace." In keeping with propaganda statements made in 1980, the main instigators of ASEAN's anti-Soviet and anti-Vietnamese policies were said to be China, in league with the US.⁴⁸ Two weeks after the special ASEAN meeting in Manila, the third interparliamentary meeting of the ASEAN states was held in Jakarta. The Soviets categorized the communique issued by the meeting as "confused" since it condemned the Vietnamese invasion of Thailand rather than the obverse. The Soviet conclusion was that "ASEAN made this assessment under growing pressure by outside powers, especially Beijing and Washington." Thus, the Soviet commentator stated, the US and China were the "true instigators and culprits in the undeclared war on the Thai-[Cambodian] border." The Soviet commentator again called on the ASEAN states to answer the communist Indochinese call for negotiations to create a "zone of peace" in Southeast Asia.⁴⁹

Soviet commentary in late September through the end of the year continued to attack US and Chinese involvement in affairs of the ASEAN states. In late September, Soviet commentator Geronin noted that the just-completed visit by US Vice Admiral Trost and "Pentagon representative" R. Komer to Indonesia and Thailand was for the purpose of drawing ASEAN into a military alliance.⁵⁰ In October Moscow noted that US military equipment had arrived in Thailand and other ASEAN states. US fighter aircraft were also recently delivered to Indonesia by Lt-General Hughes, who called on the ASEAN states to standardize their weapons. The Soviets stressed that the US military assistance to ASEAN was not for putative defense purposes but rather was

designed to harness ASEAN to US militarism.⁵¹ In late November, the Soviets accused China of using the overseas Chinese (termed "Huaqiao") to manipulate the ASEAN states into following the Chinese foreign policy line under fear of Huaqiao uprisings. In the long term, the Soviet commentator stated, China wants to reclaim and expand into Asian territories, "as the ancient Chinese Mandarins used to dream [of doing]."⁵²

(c) Contacts

In late March-early April 1980, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolai Firyubin visited Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, and Singapore. In Singapore he met with the Foreign Minister, S. Rajaratnam, the senior Minister of State, S. Dhanabalan, and the Premier, Lee Kuan Yew. Firyubin reiterated a Vietnamese proposal to sign nonaggression treaties with each of the ASEAN states. Singapore repeated its position that Vietnamese troops be withdrawn from Cambodia before the ASEAN states enter into cooperative agreements with Vietnam. Singaporean officials also cautioned the Soviets that Vietnam's propaganda attacks typifying Singapore as being China's proxy were racist.⁵³

During May-June 1980, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach travelled to Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand to call for dialogue between ASEAN and communist Indochina. Thach pushed the proposal set forth during the January 1980 meeting of the foreign ministers of communist Indochina that the ASEAN states sign bilateral nonaggression treaties with the communist Indochina states. These bilateral treaties would then form the basis for the multilateral implementation of the "zone of peace" in Southeast Asia.⁵⁴ Thach's visit came shortly before the annual meeting of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers, and during the meeting the Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Mochtar Kusumaatmaja, gave a positive assessment of the Thach visit and urged ASEAN dialogue with communist Indochina. TASS observed, however, that "the forces of world reaction relying on certain quarters inside ASEAN succeeded to a certain extent in directing the conference [in the direction of] their aggressive, hegemonistic ambitions."⁵⁵ In the Soviet view, one of the means used by the US and China to "slander Vietnam and sow doubts about its peace-loving policy" was to instigate an attack by "Pol Potists" based in Thailand, which was "firmly rebuffed" by the Cambodian border guards. This attack, occurring just before the ASEAN meeting, was more accurately portrayed in the West as a Vietnamese invasion of Thailand.⁵⁶ Soviet commentator Krichevskiy noted, however, that soon after the Thai "incursion" across the Cambodian border, the US and China supplied Thailand with additional weapons in order to further encourage conflict and to cause ASEAN to enter into the orbit of US-Chinese hegemonism.⁵⁷

(2) Soviet (and communist Indochinese) Contacts With and Commentary on ASEAN During 1981

(a) Overview

As in 1980, a major preoccupation of Soviet propaganda and official contacts in 1981 revolved around the ASEAN-initiated international conference on Cambodia, held in July. The Soviets repeated their assertions that the conference was actually part of a US and Chinese initiative to pave the way for a military takeover in Indochina. Before the conference, Firyubin

visited Thailand and set up a Vietnamese-Thai meeting to discuss border and other relations, but this meeting was unfruitful. Firyubin's was probably a last minute attempt to weaken the solidarity of the ASEAN states against the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia by showing that Vietnam would respect Thailand's borders. Such weakening of ASEAN's collective resolve would probably have influenced, the Soviets hoped, the overall tenor of the forthcoming conference. Soviet propaganda became harsh--directly attacking ASEAN policy--later in the year in the face of three setbacks to Soviet efforts to get ASEAN to accept the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, and hence the status quo in Indochina: the International Conference on Cambodia; the formation of a Cambodian government in exile; and the UN vote not to strip Democratic Kampuchea (Cambodia) of its seat in the General Assembly.

(b) Commentary

In January 1981, the foreign ministers of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia convened another conference to both condemn China's "extensive subversive activities in the region" and to propose to the ASEAN states that a regional conference be held to reach agreement on a peace treaty for the region.⁵⁸ Soviet commentators responded by stepping up their verbal attacks against China. In early February a particularly vituperative article on China appeared in Krasnaya zvezda. The article stated that "the modern Chinese emperors. . . view Southeast Asia as a natural sphere of Chinese influence." The article further asserted Beijing was using Pol Pot to decimate the Cambodian population so that Chinese could settle on the territory. The article warned the ASEAN states that China planned to eventually annex the ASEAN states.⁵⁹ On 23 February, Brezhnev in his report to the 26th Congress of the CPSU in Moscow appealed to the Far Eastern states to enter into a dialogue.⁶⁰ Soviet media took up this call for dialogue, stressing that the USSR supported the proposal of the communist Indochinese states to convene an international conference to guarantee any peace treaty signed by the Southeast Asian states.⁶¹

The Soviet Union and its ally, Vietnam, received a strong propaganda defeat at the nonaligned conference of foreign ministers in New Delhi in February 1981. The foreign ministers, despite pressure from the Soviet bloc, called for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and Cambodia. The ASEAN countries, and Singapore in particular, were instrumental in getting the conference to call for the removal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia.⁶²

Soviet commentary on ASEAN from March through April focused on a number of common themes: (1) warnings to ASEAN that US visits and arms sales were turning ASEAN into a military alliance;⁶³ (2) warnings that China was trying to "partition" ASEAN;⁶⁴ and (3) condemnations of the "Tokyo-Washington" proposal for a Pacific Community.⁶⁵

In early May ASEAN held its annual foreign ministers meeting. Soviet commentary deplored ASEAN's continued planning for an international conference on Cambodia. The Soviets, in an Indonesian language broadcast to Indonesia, warned that continued planning of the conference was bound to lead to dissension within ASEAN: "Various circles in the ASEAN countries have begun to realize that to get involved in the imperialist and hegemonist plot

against [Cambodia]" by US and Chinese politicians represents attempts "to subjugate ASEAN." The broadcast praised Indonesians who opposed anti-Vietnamese ASEAN policies.⁶⁶ In mid-May Laotian Foreign Minister Phoun Sipaseut was dispatched to Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. He stressed the Chinese and US threat to Southeast Asia in his visit, and pushed the communist Indochinese proposal for a regional conference between ASEAN and communist Indochina.⁶⁷

In late May the ASEAN Standing Committee, the steering organ for ASEAN, met to finalize proposals for the international conference on Cambodia to be held in New York in July. Soviet commentary depicted the activities of the standing committee as "following Beijing's line" regarding the Cambodian problem,⁶⁸ and hastened to exaggerate differences of viewpoint within ASEAN as a means of sowing dissension. Pravda noted that the ASEAN states' (Soviet-financed and influenced) media supported dialogue rather than confrontation with communist Indochina, and thus opposed the convening of an international conference on Cambodia. Pravda saw China as the instigator of the conference, with "Washington [and] NATO circles in tow, fall[ing] in with Beijing's stance."⁶⁹

The communist Indochinese foreign ministers met in mid-June in an attempt to circumvent the ASEAN-supported initiative to hold an international conference on Cambodia. They proposed holding a regional peace conference in mid-July (at the same time as the ASEAN-backed international conference on Cambodia).⁷⁰ On 20 June a Soviet commentator reported that the just-ending 14th meeting of the ASEAN foreign ministers had "yielded to pressure" by China and the US to endorse the plan to hold an international conference on the Cambodia problem. Another commentator noted that "no reply was forthcoming" from the meeting on the proposal by the communist Indochinese foreign ministers to substitute a regional peace conference for the international conference on Cambodia.⁷¹

On 12 July, one day before the international conference on Cambodia was convened, the government of Malaysia announced the expulsion of three officials of the Soviet embassy, including the KGB Resident, and the arrest of the former political secretary to the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister on charges of espionage. The Malaysian Foreign Ministry stated that the espionage work of the Soviet officials "pose[d] a direct threat to the country's security."⁷²

The International Conference on Cambodia was held under the United Nation's aegis in New York in mid-July. Soviet commentators blamed the results of the conference--that "foreign armed forces" withdraw from Cambodia and that UN peacekeeping forces monitor free elections--primarily on the US and China. The Soviets noted with approval the Indonesian representative's opposition to attempts to restore Pol Pot to power, and condemned the anti-Soviet line taken by Singapore and Thailand. However, ASEAN by and large was absolved of responsibility for the results of the conference: "the concealing plaster designed to lend the semblance of an initiative coming not from the US and China but from the ASEAN countries. . . had time to break off. It was immediately obvious to everyone [by the time of the conference]. . . that the demand to hold a 'conference on [Cambodia]' [was instigated by] US, Chinese, and Japanese spokesmen."⁷³

In August Premier of the PRC State Council Zhao Ziyang visited the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore in order, Soviet commentators claimed, to "set the ASEAN countries against the [communist] Indochinese states." The Soviets also pointed out that the Chinese were actively trying to subvert the governments of many of the ASEAN states, in an effort to "regain their once lost lands" in Southeast Asia.⁷⁴

In September two events occurred which defeated Soviet attempts to get the ASEAN states to accept the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. First, in early September the leaders of Cambodia's three main anti-Vietnamese groups met in Singapore to form a coalition government in exile. The ASEAN states were instrumental in the successful formation of the coalition. At the same time that the meeting in Singapore was held, General Secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party Le Duan visited Moscow and met with Brezhnev. Brezhnev and Le Duan called for communist Indochinese dialogue with ASEAN and Japan. Barely one week later, all three heads of government of the communist Indochinese states met in Moscow with Brezhnev and supposedly agreed on a long-term strategy of military restraint and patient diplomacy in Southeast Asia as a means of persuading ASEAN to enter into dialogue.⁷⁵ Right after this summit meeting of the communist Indochinese heads of state, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach unexpectedly endorsed the ASEAN ZOPFAN proposal. This ploy failed, and on 18 September 1981, the UN General Assembly voted not to strip Democratic Kampuchea (Cambodia) of its UN representation. This was the second major defeat of Soviet attempts to force acceptance of the status quo in communist Indochina. Soviet commentary thereafter became unusually vituperative. An article in the 20 September issue of Izvestiya went beyond the usual line that the US and China had pressured ASEAN to support them, asserting that "by choosing to magnify the non-existent '[Cambodian] problem' the leaders of certain ASEAN countries are now to all intents and purposes embroiled in the unworthy and dangerous business of organizing gross interference in the affairs of [Cambodia]." The "collusion with Beijing" by Thailand, Singapore, and even Indonesia in setting up a Cambodian coalition government was directly attacked: "the ASEAN countries' involvement in knocking together a 'coalition'. . . [is] particularly unsavory."⁷⁶

By October, the standard Soviet line had been at least partially reasserted. An article in the 7 October issue of Pravda noted that the ASEAN states, because of pressure from the US and China, had failed to respond positively to an communist Indochinese memorandum submitted to the UN calling for "peaceful coexistence" between communist Indochina and ASEAN.⁷⁷ Harsh Soviet commentary about attempts by the ASEAN states to "knock together" a coalition government composed of Son Sann, Norodom Sihanouk, and Pol Pot continued through November,⁷⁸ but in December there were signs that the standard line that the US and China pressured ASEAN had been reasserted in the face of ASEAN determination to support such a coalition.⁷⁹

(c) Contacts

In late April, Firyubin visited Thailand, and suggested to Thai Deputy Foreign Minister Arun Panupong that he meet with Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Vo Dong Giang to discuss an improvement in Thai-Vietnamese relations. This Vietnamese-Thai meeting was held in Rangoon, Burma in June. Nothing was accomplished during this meeting. On his return to Hanoi, Giang

stopped over in Bangkok and held a press conference where he threatened Thailand that if it proceeded with a plan to repatriate Cambodian refugees, Thailand could expect a border incursion similar to the one which occurred in 1980. This incident led Arun to term Giang's meeting a Soviet-Vietnamese propaganda ploy.⁸⁰

(3) Soviet (and communist Indochinese) Contacts With and Commentary on ASEAN During 1982

(a) Overview

In 1982 a July meeting of the Cambodian coalition government in exile brought forth strident criticism of ASEAN. The open ASEAN efforts to form and nurture the government in exile may have been perceived by the Soviets as similar to their own support for such governments which would ride into power with occupying Soviet armies. The harsh criticism of ASEAN's support for the coalition served as a warning to the ASEAN states against greater assistance to the coalition. Also during 1982 the Soviets maintained the policy of attempting to improve relations with individual ASEAN states, dispatching a USSR Supreme Soviet delegation to discuss friendship between the USSR and Indonesia.

(b) Commentary

Soviet commentary on ASEAN during 1982 adhered to standard themes throughout the first half of the year. Soviet attempts to persuade Indonesia to adopt a softer position on the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia received a setback when Indonesia, on 8 February, announced that the Soviet Assistant Military Attache and an Aeroflot official were being expelled for espionage activities. A week later the Indonesians closed down the Aeroflot office in Jakarta and cancelled all Aeroflot flights to Indonesia. The Vice President of Indonesia, Adam Malik, warned the Soviet Union that Indonesia would not tolerate violations of its sovereignty and hinted that overall Soviet-Indonesian relations might have been affected by the incident.⁸¹

Two meetings of the communist Indochinese foreign ministers were held in the first half of 1982 to focus propaganda on Soviet-Vietnamese proposals on Cambodia. On 16-17 February 1982, the Fifth Conference of foreign ministers of communist Indochina was held in Vientiane. The foreign ministers expressed satisfaction with the Soviet peace plan for Southeast Asia and called on the ASEAN states to join in dialogue. If dialogue produced positive results, the foreign ministers stated, then Vietnam would withdraw some of its troops from Cambodia.⁸² At the Sixth Conference of the foreign ministers of communist Indochina, held 6-7 July in Ho Chi Minh City, the foreign ministers unveiled a Soviet-backed plan for an international conference on Southeast Asia, which would include the participation of the US, USSR, PRC, France, Great Britain, and India. All these proposals were rejected by the ASEAN states.⁸³

In March a Soviet commentator stated that Vietnamese defense against Chinese "intrusions" onto their territory served to prevent China from "expand[ing] over Southeast Asia." The Soviets noted that "ASEAN's political and social circles" had increasingly opposed Chinese expansionism, and had

hence "called for a change in ASEAN's policy toward [Cambodia]."84 Soviet commentary later in March focused on attacking plans by the US to hold joint military exercises later in the year with ASEAN countries.85 Mikhail Gorbachev led the CPSU delegation to the 5th Congress of the Vietnamese CP held in March 1982, where he praised communist Indochinese "solidarity" in fighting against US-Chinese efforts to create conflict between ASEAN and communist Indochina.86

Izvestiya in late April carried a classic article attacking growing US militarism in Southeast Asia, reiterating standard Soviet propaganda themes: (1) the US "pendulum" has shifted back to US involvement in Southeast Asia after years of neglect following defeat in Vietnam; (2) the US is interested in exploiting the region's population, natural resources, and strategic location; (3) the US has recreated a large military presence in the region; (4) the US has undertaken a vast propaganda campaign to mask their reinvolvement in the region--campaigns about the "Soviet-Vietnamese threat"; (5) the US is arming the ASEAN states and forcing them to increase their arms budgets and military manpower; (6) the US is sending constant visitors and delegations to ASEAN to put pressure on it; (7) the US is encouraging the ASEAN states to develop their own arms industries; (8) the US is pushing for joint military exercises and weapons standardization; (9) the US is pushing the concept of the "Pacific Community" which is really a military bloc; (10) the US wants to use ASEAN to create conflict with communist Indochina; (11) the US "forced" the ASEAN states to "knock together" the "Pol Pot coalition"; (12) the US is in league with China; and (13) the US uses all the previously mentioned methods to transform ASEAN into a US military alliance.87

In June, Soviet commentary on the ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting in Singapore was muted, praising the Ministers' criticism of Western economic policies and of attempts to militarize ASEAN.88 The Soviets praised the outcome of the foreign ministers' meeting despite the fact that just before the meeting a declaration on the creation of the "coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea" (Cambodia) was signed by Sihanouk, Son Sann, and Khieu Samphan in Kuala Lumpur.89

In early July, Soviet commentary became very harsh after Malaysia had hosted a meeting of the Cambodian coalition government. Although Soviet commentary continued to link ASEAN support for the coalition with US-Chinese pressure, it stressed that "serious concern" had been raised by Malaysia's hosting and support of the coalition. The Soviets also attacked the discussion of the Cambodian problem at the (previously-praised) June ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting in new, harsh tones, stating that the discussion "constitute[d] gross interference in a sovereign state's internal affairs and a clear violation of the elementary norms of international law. Furthermore, this is contrary to the Association's charter. . . ASEAN's position not only undermines the basis of a real settlement of the problems of Southeast Asia. . . [but] also creates preconditions for further US and Chinese interference in the region. . . ."90 Later in July Pravda called on the ASEAN states to give up opposition to the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and to endorse the proposal of the just-ended communist Indochinese foreign ministers' meeting that a security zone between Thailand and Cambodia be created. This new proposal was different from the communist Indochinese proposal of

1980 in that the new proposal did not envisage a demilitarized zone but rather only a zone where Vietnamese troops would be excluded.⁹¹

On 9 August Pravda published an article aimed at discrediting a proposal by South Korean President Chon Tu-hwan that a Pacific conference be held which would include the ASEAN states, stating that this proposal aimed at creating a US military alliance and at "mak[ing] the ASEAN states accomplices in imperialist intrigues."⁹² On the same day another article in Izvestiya positively assessed trends in the ASEAN states toward better relations with the socialist states, including the USSR, and urged that the goals of the association (i.e., ZOPFAN) could only be met as a result of dialogue with communist Indochina.⁹³

In September the Soviets stepped up their campaign warning against the US militarization of ASEAN, perhaps in anticipation of US Secretary of Defense Weinberger's visit to Southeast Asia and the Pacific.⁹⁴ Weinberger had visited the Philippines in the Spring of 1982, and on his late-October early-November trip he visited Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand. In the ASEAN states, Soviet commentary noted, Weinberger used the idea of a "Soviet military threat" as a screen to hide the militarization of ASEAN.⁹⁵ A Thai-language Moscow Radio broadcast to Thailand asserted that Weinberger's visit was part of a US attempt to militarize ASEAN for the purpose of threatening Cambodian independence.⁹⁶

In mid-November, Pravda highlighted the discussion going on in the UN General Assembly about the continued seating of the Khmer Rouge representative in the UN. Pravda noted that there were two sides to the discussion: that of the communist Indochinese states and the USSR; and that of imperialism and other external forces (implying China). The USSR Permanent Representative to the UN, O. A. Troyanovskiy, expressed support for the proposals for peace in Southeast Asia put forward by the communist Indochinese countries. ASEAN was not directly blamed for its leadership in discussions of the Cambodian problem, but instead was depicted as being a victim of imperialism and other forces.⁹⁷

(c) Contacts

In late July a USSR Supreme Soviet delegation visited Indonesia and, in a meeting with President Suharto, stressed the development of friendship and cooperation between the two countries. Also, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach visited several ASEAN states and while in Thailand threatened the ASEAN states that if they did not improve relations with communist Indochina, Vietnam would be compelled to give the Soviets greater access to military bases in Vietnam.⁹⁸

In early October 1982, a Vietnamese party and state delegation headed by Chairman of the State Council and Politburo member Truong Chinh visited Moscow for summit talks. Chinh confirmed that "the views of the USSR and the [communist] Indochinese countries are identical" regarding policy in Southeast Asia.⁹⁹

(4) Soviet (and communist Indochinese) Contacts With and Commentary on ASEAN During 1983

(a) Overview

During 1983 the Soviets stepped up their contacts with individual ASEAN states in an attempt to improve bilateral relations. Also, Kapitsa met in Moscow with the ambassadors of the ASEAN states and hinted that the USSR might deal multilaterally with ASEAN. Kapitsa visited Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines in 1983. Soviet concern over ASEAN support for the Cambodian coalition government in exile was evident with Kapitsa's threat to Singaporean leaders that Vietnam would support insurgency among the ASEAN states if ASEAN did not cease its support. As part of the Soviet campaign to resolve the problem of ASEAN-Vietnamese tensions, in June and October Thach met with representatives of various ASEAN states to push for an eventual peace settlement in Indochina.

(b) Commentary

In January Izvestiya launched an attack against a renewal of Japanese militarism in Southeast Asia, and especially in the ASEAN states, as encouraged and supported by the US. The event precipitating this round of Soviet propaganda against Japan was Yasuhiro Nakasone's accession as Japanese Prime Minister. Izvestiya cited ASEAN sources as criticizing the Japanese economic "second invasion" (the first being occupation during World War II) of the region, mentioning that "Tokyo is indeed very alarmed at the anti-Japanese feeling within the ASEAN countries. . . ."100 This anti-Japanese campaign was continued in February during Japanese Prime Minister Y. Nakasone's visit to the US, where he had spoken of Japan as "an unsinkable aircraft carrier" which could defend the region against the Soviet threat. However, Soviet commentary stressed that Japanese "militarism" was not only aimed at the Soviet Union but "also southward, into Southeast Asia." The commentary asserted that the ASEAN states had become so alarmed over Japanese militarism that the leaders of the states asked Canadian Prime Minister P. Trudeau, who visited the ASEAN states in mid-January, to "mediate" between the US and Japan to prevent US-Japanese militarization of the region, but to no avail.101

Around the same time as the beginning of the renewed campaign against Japan, Krasnaya zvezda iterated a similar theme (i.e., of outside powers threatening ASEAN) when it discussed the US penetration of ASEAN. Colonel D. Belskiy wrote that the US wanted to use ASEAN to confront the USSR, referring to a US proposal that a joint military equipment reserve be created in the ASEAN states. According to the Soviets, such a proposal was pushed during US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff J. Vessey's visit to Thailand. Vessey's visit, and Weinberger's two visits to the area within the past six months, Belskiy stated, indicated efforts of the US to turn ASEAN into a US military alliance by pushing "the coordination of military plans, the practical rehearsal of cooperation among the armed forces, the standardization of arms, [joint] combat military maneuvers, [and] more military expenditures in the countries of the region."102

In late March, Soviet commentary about the Japanese threat to ASEAN became more vigorous in preparation for Prime Minister Nakasone's visit

to the ASEAN countries and Brunei.¹⁰³ Soviet commentary held that the goal of Nakasone's trip to the ASEAN countries was to "allay the fears entertained. . . concerning Japan's ever-accelerating militarism."¹⁰⁴ Soviet commentary also tried to create dissension in ASEAN over policy toward Japan by stating that Thailand, "during World War II clearly encouraged the Japanese militarists," and was playing the same role again. The Soviets also accused Japanese monopolies of "savagely plundering" the ASEAN states. One Izvestiya article concluded: "the bellicose Japanese Government circles are trying to attain the same goals in this region as their prewar predecessors, but. . . then the emphasis was on expansion by military force; now it is on expansion by means of economic measures, but with gradually increasing military pressure," with the end goal being "the formation of an anti-Soviet bloc in East Asia."¹⁰⁵ Another commentary added to this assessment by stating that the Nakasone visit signalled a new phase of Japanese relations with ASEAN where Japan would assume the role of political and economic "leader" of ASEAN.¹⁰⁶ The same theme of the Japanese threat to ASEAN was pushed after a meeting of ASEAN and Japanese business leaders in Bangkok in late October. The Soviets reported that ASEAN "economic dependence" on Japan was causing "growing discontent" within ASEAN.¹⁰⁷

At the end of March, a meeting was held between foreign ministers of the ASEAN and EEC states, preceded by consultations between the ASEAN foreign ministers. During the consultations, the Soviets reported, the idea of holding discussions with communist Indochina was broached, but during the two-day EEC meeting the Western states proved unwilling to support the ASEAN proposal. According to Soviet commentary, the Western states used "economic levers" to control ASEAN foreign policy.¹⁰⁸

On 6 April a Thai Foreign Ministry spokesman held a press conference to announce that a meeting had been held with the Soviet ambassador to Thailand, who was informed that the "double standard policy"--the dual strategy of increasing political, economic, and cultural contacts while at the same time fostering Vietnamese militarism in the region--was "unacceptable" to Thailand and to ASEAN in general.¹⁰⁹ About a year and a half before the Thai Foreign Ministry made these assertions about Soviet policy in the region, Thai Deputy Premier Thanat Khoman had made much the same assertions. In an interview he noted that the Soviets were engaging in a disinformation campaign designed to distance the Soviets from Vietnamese militarism in the region, a campaign which he termed transparently duplicitous.¹¹⁰

In June US Secretary of State Shultz embarked on visits to the Philippines, Thailand, India, and Pakistan, and to attend the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' meeting. At the ASEAN meeting, the Soviets reported, Shultz made "belligerent calls" for an anti-Soviet stance by ASEAN, and he gave as an example of the Soviet threat the "hackneyed fabrication" that the Soviets had used yellow rain in Southeast Asia. He also called for greater support of the Cambodian coalition government and called on the Vietnamese to withdraw 30 km from the Thai border. All Shultz' proposals were reflected in the ASEAN meeting communique, the Soviets reported. Soviet commentators on the results of the meeting, however, still did not directly excoriate the ASEAN states but instead noted that ASEAN was being pushed "further and further" into confrontation with communist Indochina.¹¹¹

(c) Contacts

During the early part of 1983, the USSR made diplomatic and other contacts with the ASEAN states. In February Kapitsa visited Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia to push for dialogue between ASEAN and the communist Indochinese states. Ironically, Kapitsa's visit occurred soon after Vietnam's January 1983 dry season offensive in Western Cambodia. In Thailand Kapitsa proposed raising the level of contacts between the USSR and Thailand to the ministerial echelon or higher, with the Thais agreeing in principle to this proposal. An exchange visit of trade delegations was agreed upon. Thai officials requested that Kapitsa notify the communist Indochinese states that Thailand was not an aggressor and only wanted to defend its own territory, the Thais maintaining that tension in the region "was caused by the party receiving support from the Soviet Union." After the visit the Thais commented that the Kapitsa Soviet-Vietnamese position on the Cambodian problem--that the internal situation in Cambodia is nonnegotiable--had not changed.¹¹²

In early April, Kapitsa visited Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines, signing a cultural agreement in Manila. Kapitsa's April visits occurred just after renewed fighting along the Thai-Cambodian border, including a serious Vietnamese incursion into Thailand which had to be repulsed with napalm. As a result of the incursion, the Thai Foreign Minister summoned the Soviet and Vietnamese ambassadors and strongly condemned Vietnam's "heinous acts."¹¹³ In Singapore, according to a Singaporean Government Statement, Kapitsa threatened that Vietnam would begin to support insurgency in the region if the ASEAN states did not cease support for the Democratic Kampuchean (Cambodian) coalition government-in-exile.¹¹⁴ Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad strongly condemned Kapitsa's threat, declaring that it was "an open admission of Soviet ambitions in the region, as well as [their] intention to subvert the five ASEAN countries on the slightest excuse."¹¹⁵ Another Malaysian commentary noted that it was no surprise that Kapitsa had threatened to support insurgency in ASEAN, since "it is no secret that before China and Vietnam came into the picture, it was the Soviet Union that had helped and encouraged the growth of insurgency in this part of the world."¹¹⁶ An Indonesian editorial in KOMPAS stated that Kapitsa's remarks "could mean that the current strategy adopted by Hanoi in [Cambodia] was masterminded by Moscow. The Soviet Union has made Vietnam its pawn so as to help realize its objectives to expand its hegemony in Southeast Asia." The editorial also suggested that Kapitsa's remarks might represent another Soviet attempt to "pit one country against another within ASEAN."¹¹⁷ Singaporean Foreign Minister S. Dhanabalan stated that the threat verified ASEAN suspicions that the Soviet Union desired hegemony over the region. Dhanabalan suggested that, by using Vietnam as its military proxy, the Soviet Union hoped to eventually invade the region as it did directly in Afghanistan or as it did indirectly (through its proxy, Cuba) in several African countries. The Soviet Embassy in Bangkok denied that Kapitsa had made the threat and condemned the Singaporean government release of Kapitsa's remark as a "provocation."¹¹⁸ The Malaysians reported that a similar threat had been made by Vietnam, thus lending credence to the idea that the remark was genuine, and called on the Soviet Union to clearly state that it had no intention of subverting the region.¹¹⁹ In Malaysia, an anti-Soviet street demonstration and a youth rally took place.¹²⁰

In early March, the Ambassadors of the ASEAN states stationed in Moscow met with Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Mikhail Kapitsa at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, reportedly the first time that the Soviet Union had treated the representatives of all five of the ASEAN member countries as a bloc. Kapitsa told the meeting that the USSR intended to strengthen its relations with ASEAN. He also informed the ambassadors that Vietnam would not withdraw its troops from Cambodia until there was a meeting between ASEAN and the communist Indochinese states. He assured the ambassadors that Vietnam would not invade Thailand and praised the results of Thai Deputy Foreign Minister Arun Phanuphong's visit to Moscow and his own return visit to Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia earlier in the year.¹²¹

In early June, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach visited Indonesia and the Philippines to push the peace proposals made by the meeting of the communist Indochinese heads of state in February.¹²² In February, the heads of state had agreed on a timetable for partial withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia and called on the ASEAN states to meet with the communist Indochinese states at an international meeting to sign nonaggression treaties with communist Indochina.¹²³ At the ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting held soon after Thach's visit the ASEAN states basically rejected Thach's proposals and insisted that a security zone be created in western Cambodia before the ASEAN states would agree to other measures.¹²⁴

The shootdown of the Korean Air Liner (KAL 007) in September 1983 caused some repercussions to Soviet relations with the ASEAN states. Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore cancelled planned visits by the Chief of the Southeast Asian Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Anatoliy Zaytsev. Thailand and Malaysia strongly condemned the shootdown, in which Thai and Malaysian citizens perished. Singapore also cancelled the upcoming visit of the Riga ballet. Singapore was also reported to have been among the first in the UN to call on the Soviet Union to legally and morally rectify its action.¹²⁵

In early October Thach, while visiting the UN, met with the representatives of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand to continue pushing the Soviet-Indochinese proposal that a joint security zone be established on the Cambodian-Thai border as a prelude to a more far-reaching peace settlement in the region.¹²⁶ In November, the call for dialogue between ASEAN and communist Indochina was put forth by the communist Indochinese heads of state at the meeting of the nonaligned nations in Delhi.¹²⁷

(5) Soviet (and communist Indochinese) Contacts With and Commentary About ASEAN During 1984

(a) Overview

In 1984 the Soviets and Vietnamese maintained the high level of contacts and "peace" overtures begun in 1983. Thach toured Indonesia and Thailand in March, and the Indonesian Foreign Minister visited Moscow in April. Soviet Foreign Ministry Southeast Asian Department Head Anatoliy Zaitsev visited Singapore in August. The Thai Foreign Minister also visited Moscow, and Thach revisited Thailand in October. Indonesia and the USSR signed a trade protocol in October. In keeping with these peace overtures,

Soviet propaganda in 1984 stressed the need for normalization of relations between the ASEAN states and the communist Indochinese states and the peaceful nature of the Soviet Union.

(b) Commentary

Soviet commentary concerning ASEAN increased in January 1984 around the time of the annual ASEAN foreign ministers' Conference in Jakarta. Before the conference, Soviet commentary focused on attempts by the US to turn ASEAN into a military bloc by selling Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, and the Philippines F-16 fighters and other weapons. The Soviets also reminded the ASEAN public that the US wanted to base CMs and chemical weapons in the ASEAN states.¹²⁸ Alarm was also raised over the servicing of a British antisubmarine aircraft carrier, which the Soviets claimed carried nuclear weapons, in Singapore ports. The Soviets pointed out that the servicing of the carrier violated the Kuala Lumpur declaration which called for the creation of ZOPFAN.¹²⁹ After the ASEAN foreign ministers' conference the Soviets reported approvingly that the foreign ministers had agreed to step up the implementation of ZOPFAN as a means of frustrating US attempts to militarize the region.¹³⁰

Attacks against US involvement in ASEAN affairs intensified in late January, when an important commentary appeared which reveals Soviet perceptions of US activities in the region. According to the commentary, the US is using "the tactics of small steps" to reach the strategic goal of turning ASEAN into a military bloc. The "small steps" involve refurbishing existing bases in the Philippines, reopening bases in Thailand, and building new bases (such as Pattaya in Thailand). Along with such activities, the US seeks to involve the ASEAN states in extensive military exercises. The process of modernizing the armed forces of the ASEAN states and of standardizing the weapons of the armed forces are additional "small steps" toward creating a military bloc. Lastly, the US is "foisting weapons" on the states. The end result of the "small steps" will place ASEAN under US military control and will allow the US to use the ASEAN states to fight a nuclear war with communist Indochina: the US "is planning to force ASEAN to fight against Asians."¹³¹

In February Soviet propagandists claimed that recent US military and civilian visits signified a stepped-up attempt to militarize ASEAN, and juxtaposed these visits to the peaceful initiatives of the communist Indochinese states. At the beginning of 1984 the communist Indochinese foreign ministers had held another meeting where they called for dialogue between ASEAN and communist Indochina. The foreign ministers warned ASEAN that the main threat to regional peace was from outside (i.e., Western) interference, conveniently forgetting communist Indochinese links with the USSR. The "feverish US activities over the past few weeks" were said to have as their primary goal the remilitarization of Southeast Asia. The present US leadership was said to possess a "Vietnam nostalgia" leading to stepped up US militarism in the region.¹³²

In March 1984 Lt-Col. B. Viktorov, writing in Krasnaya zvezda, concluded that the purpose of the recent US military and civilian visits was for basing cruise missiles and chemical weapons in Southeast Asia. Viktorov

repeated a standard litany of charges against US relations with the ASEAN states: (1) the US was reemphasizing the establishment of military bases in Southeast Asia; (2) the US was "harnessing ASEAN" to Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand to form the Pacific Community, a military bloc designed to quell national liberation struggles; (3) the US was attempting to use weapons standardization, joint training, and joint military exercises as a means of militarizing ASEAN; and (4) the US was supplying arms and arms technology in order to gain control over the states' armed forces. Viktorov added that the "arms race" among the ASEAN countries increased instability in the region vis-a-vis other states and hence increased ASEAN dependence on the US for security. The US used the ideas of the "allegedly increasing Soviet expansionism" and the "Vietnamese threat" to frighten the ASEAN states into accepting increased US military aid.¹³³

In August 1984, Soviet propaganda efforts focused strongly on "peace initiatives" of the socialist states in an attempt to dispel the ASEAN states' overwhelmingly negative attitude toward Vietnam as evidenced by the communique issued at the July meeting of the ASEAN foreign ministers. In a Krasnaya zvezda article, Candidate of Historical Sciences G. Grammatchikov blamed the US for problems between the ASEAN states and communist Indochina. Propaganda concerning the Soviet-Vietnamese threat to the region, as reflected in the communique issued at the ASEAN foreign ministers' conference held in January, showed US pressure on the conference participants, Grammatchikov asserted. This threat was fictitious, Grammatchikov reported, since Vietnam "has never fought against the ASEAN countries. . . [and] the USSR. . . has never conducted combat operations in Southeast Asia." Grammatchikov emphasized the features of the communist Indochinese peace proposal: "withdrawal of all armed forces from the region, an end to foreign interference, and the creation of a zone of peace. . . ." Grammatchikov further stated that, as an interim solution, the communist Indochinese states had proposed creation of border security zones. In early 1984 the leaders of the three communist Indochinese states had met with Chernenko and all four leaders agreed on a common course of policy in Southeast Asia, and Grammatchikov emphasized that, as Chernenko had stated, the USSR would be willing to assist the UN Security Council in guaranteeing that any accords reached as a result of a communist Indochinese-ASEAN settlement would be adhered to.¹³⁴

(c) Contacts

Moscow and Hanoi stepped up their campaign for "dialogue" between ASEAN and communist Indochina during March. In mid-March Thach toured Indonesia, Australia, and Thailand advocating a Soviet plan for bilateral or multilateral negotiations to improve relations among the states of Southeast Asia. To prepare the way for negotiations, Thach called for convening a regional or international conference on Southeast Asian affairs.¹³⁵ The main purpose of the Thach tour, and the subsequent propaganda campaign, however, appears to have been an attempt to weaken ASEAN support for the Cambodian resistance movement. In late March, it was repeatedly stressed that ASEAN support for the armed resistance violates the tenets of ZOPFAN and that the resistance was composed of "Pol Potist thugs." The propaganda pushed the line that moderation was prevailing in ASEAN and that an "easing of tensions" in Southeast Asia would emerge if only the Pol Potists were eliminated.

Propaganda statements excused ASEAN support for the resistance by claiming that outside interference was really to blame for the "Cambodian problem."

The intensive Soviet-Indochinese campaign calling for "dialogue" with ASEAN was stepped up in mid-year. At the beginning of April Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmaja visited Moscow for talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, the first such visit by an Indonesian Foreign Minister to the Soviet Union since 1974. The two foreign ministers agreed, according to TASS, that normalization of relations between communist Indochina and ASEAN could proceed except for the outside interference of the US.¹³⁶ Soon after the visit, Soviet broadcasts in Indonesian to Indonesia stepped up criticism of US interference in ASEAN, in an apparent attempt to exacerbate Indonesian dissatisfaction with the US.¹³⁷ The ASEAN foreign ministers held an unscheduled meeting to discuss the visit as well as the visit of Thach to some of the ASEAN states. Moscow saw the decision of the meeting to continue the present policies toward communist Indochina as a sign of immobilism and dissension within ASEAN, boding well for future Soviet influence attempts.¹³⁸

The Soviet-Vietnamese view of the Thach visit to Indonesia was at variance with Indonesia's assessment of the visit. Suharto had suggested to Thach during the visit that Vietnam might take part in a proposed international peacekeeping force which would move into Cambodian territory vacated by the Vietnamese Army during its withdrawal from Cambodia. Thach rebuffed Suharto's conciliatory proposal, and this led to a hardening of Indonesia's position on the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. At the June 1984 ASEAN foreign ministers meeting, the participants, mindful of Vietnam's intransigence, issued the harshest condemnation of Vietnam's foreign policy since Vietnam occupied Cambodia in 1978.¹³⁹ Soviet commentators ignored ASEAN's real dissatisfaction with Vietnam's foreign policy, instead attributing the results of the foreign ministers meeting to pressure exerted by visiting US Secretary of State Shultz. The Soviet media stressed that Shultz' role was to "neutralize" the trend within ASEAN to seek dialogue with communist Indochina and to persuade the states to join the "Washington-Tokyo-Seoul military triangle."¹⁴⁰

As part of the campaign of the Soviet Union and Vietnam to appear willing to settle the Cambodian problem, Zaitsev visited Singapore and called for dialogue.¹⁴¹ In addition, Nguyen Co Thach revisited Bangkok in early October to discuss the need for communist Indochinese-ASEAN negotiations.¹⁴² As part of a major Thai initiative to improve relations with the Soviet Union, Permanent Secretary of Foreign Affairs Asa Sarasin visited Moscow in early October. In explaining the visit, the Thai Foreign Ministry stated that the initiative illustrated Thailand's recognition of Soviet influence and presence in Southeast Asia. Besides improving Soviet-Thai cooperation, Sarasin hoped to persuade the Soviet Union to support the ASEAN states' formal appeal for a political settlement in Cambodia, made in September.¹⁴³ In mid-October Ali Wardhana, Indonesian Minister for Economic, Financial, and Industrial and National Development, visited the USSR and signed a trade protocol.¹⁴⁴ In early December a seminar was held in Jakarta which discussed the growth of trade relations between Eastern Europe and ASEAN. In commenting on the growth in trade and economic ties between the socialist countries and ASEAN, Pravda noted that these ties indicate liberation from imperialism and

the development of economic cooperation which could lead to political rapprochement and peace in the region.¹⁴⁵

(6) Soviet (and communist Indochinese) Contacts With and Commentary on ASEAN During 1985

(a) Overview

In 1985 Soviet and communist Indochinese commentary and activities centered around new initiatives to ameliorate ASEAN's resistance to the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and resistance to Soviet activities in the region. In addition, the Soviets stepped up bilateral contacts with the ASEAN states. Trade, cultural, and political negotiations occurred with several ASEAN states in an intensified effort to counter Chinese influence among some of the ASEAN states and to take advantage of ASEAN states' trade problems with the West, particularly the United States. While the ASEAN states maintained their position that any settlement of the Cambodian problem required the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and the holding of free elections, by late 1985 there appeared several signs that, exclusive of the Cambodian problems, there was movement toward improved relations with both the USSR and Vietnam by several ASEAN states.

(b) Commentary and Contacts

The communist Indochinese foreign ministers, at their regular semiannual meeting in January, made a new proposal that if the ASEAN states ceased support to the "Pol Pot clique," Vietnam would withdraw its troops from Cambodia. The communique issued by the foreign ministers proposed that "free general elections" be part of the overall political settlement in Cambodia, and implied that Prince Sihanouk, Son Sann, and even low-level followers of Pol Pot could participate as candidates in the election. The communique also repeated the call for an "international conference" on Cambodia and suggested that an international mechanism could supervise the political settlement there. These proposals are very similar to the conditions for a settlement outlined by the ASEAN foreign ministers in September 1984, which included withdrawal of foreign troops, internationally supervised elections with the participation of all Cambodians, and the setting up of an international peace-keeping force.¹⁴⁶

In Spring, 1985 senior officials of ASEAN met in Brunei and formulated a proposal for "proximity meetings" between the three Cambodian resistance partners and the Vietnam-backed Heng Samrin regime in Phnom Penh (the two sides would negotiate in separate rooms, using intermediaries--hence the term "proximity meetings"). In early May Malaysian Deputy Minister Kadir travelled to Moscow to ask the Soviets to proffer the "proximity meetings" proposal to Vietnam. At the end of May ASEAN officials and members of the Cambodian resistance movement met in Bangkok to further discuss the proposal, including the possible inclusion of Vietnam as a participant in the "proximity meetings." The proposal for inclusion of Vietnam was pushed by the resistance forces, while the ASEAN officials stressed the meeting's "Cambodians only" character as a means of circumventing the question of Vietnam's role in Cambodian politics and hence making the proposal more palatable to the Vietnamese.¹⁴⁷

At the annual meeting of the ASEAN foreign ministers, held in early July 1985, the foreign ministers formally called for meetings between the Cambodian resistance forces and Vietnam along with Cambodia. Although this proposal had already met with some opposition from Vietnam, the foreign ministers were hopeful that a formal proposal would meet with success because it contained an implicit acquiescence to the existing Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. US Secretary of State Shultz, attending the foreign ministers' meeting, voiced opposition to the talks proposal.¹⁴⁸ Soviet commentary on the Shultz visit was predictably negative, stressing that his goal was to "push a number of Southeast Asian countries toward confrontation" with communist Indochina.¹⁴⁹ Soviet commentary on the ASEAN proposal for talks termed it as simply another attempt "to interfere in the home affairs" of Cambodia, but there may have been greater Soviet interest in the proposal than public statements revealed.¹⁵⁰ Just before the ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting, a Vietnamese party and government delegation led by General Secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party Le Duan visited Moscow. After the Vietnamese delegation departed, Le Duan remained in Moscow on a "vacation." At the same time, Cambodian Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Politburo member Hun Sen also arrived in Moscow for a "vacation." Lastly, a delegation headed by K. Keokinnali, Laotian Head of the Chancellery (General Department) of the Central Committee, visited the USSR from 6-25 June. While these visits probably centered around arrangements for the new Soviet 5-year economic plan, this flurry of contacts may also have been related to the new ASEAN initiative regarding Cambodia and may have signified Soviet efforts to work out a common response to the initiative.¹⁵¹

A conference of the communist Indochinese foreign ministers was held in Phnom Penh on August 15-16. The communique issued by the participants pledged a total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia by 1990. It also proposed an earlier date of withdrawal if an international political settlement reached, and proposed talks between the Cambodian resistance movement and the Heng Samrin government, on the condition that the Khmer Rouge be excluded from the talks. The communique voiced total support for Soviet foreign policy goals and the Soviets were quick to express their own "complete solidarity" with the communist Indochinese peace initiative.¹⁵²

In July-August 1985 Zaitsev toured Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia to lobby for an ASEAN rapprochement with the communist Indochinese states. Zaitsev pushed the familiar idea that an international conference attended by all parties involved in the Cambodian conflict be convened. He linked the holding of such a conference with the ASEAN proposal to establish ZOPFAN in Southeast Asia. The ASEAN states asked Zaitsev to convince Vietnam to accept the ASEAN plan for proximity talks among the parties involved in the Cambodian conflict.¹⁵³

On 21 August Thach arrived in Indonesia to discuss the communist Indochinese peace initiative. Indonesia had earlier been designated by ASEAN as the interlocutor between ASEAN and the communist Indochinese states regarding the Cambodian problem. Thach's trip to Indonesia as the representative of the communist Indochinese states represented the first time talks had been held between ASEAN and communist Indochina since the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. Thach and Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja discussed the nature of proximity talks and who the proposed "go between"

would be between the Cambodian coalition government in exile and the Vietnamese-Cambodian side. Burma, France, Finland, or Australia were mentioned as mediators. Immediately after visiting Indonesia (with a brief stopover in Singapore), Thach flew to Moscow to brief Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze about the talks in Indonesia.¹⁵⁴ Shevardnadze proclaimed his support for Thach's peace initiatives. Just before Thach's visit, Laotian General Secretary Kaysone Phomvihane visited Moscow and met with Gorbachev. Later in the month Soviet Politburo member V. Vorotnikov flew to Hanoi, ostensibly to take part in the 40th anniversary celebrations of (North) Vietnam's independence.¹⁵⁵ In early September, Vietnam's Defense Minister Van Tren Dung visited Moscow and met with Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Gromyko. During the meeting Gromyko and Dung noted that "Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation in all spheres contributes to the socialist and communist construction in both countries . . . [and] is an important factor for peace in Southeast Asia," and called on the ASEAN states to endorse Vietnam's peace initiatives. Indicating the unity of Soviet and Vietnamese policy toward ASEAN, a Soviet commentator stated that "the measures set forth by Vietnam jointly with Laos and Cambodia and their goal of a stable situation in the region have the Soviet Union's full support."¹⁵⁶

On 2 September Khmer Rouge radio announced that Pol Pot had retired as chief commander of the guerrilla army. While this may have been only a cosmetic change by the Khmer Rouge in order to appear less menacing, it may have been designed to influence Vietnamese demands that the Khmer Rouge be excluded from any negotiations over the status of Cambodia.¹⁵⁷ In early November Vietnamese Minister of State Vo Dong Giang stated that Vietnam would agree to direct talks between the Cambodian coalition government in exile and the Vietnamese-backed Heng Samrin regime, including the Khmer Rouge but personally excluding Pol Pot and Ieng Sary. However, the Vietnamese still insisted that any result of such talks must include the elimination of the Khmer Rouge as a political and military organization before "free" elections could be held in Cambodia.¹⁵⁸

In early November 1985 a high-level Soviet delegation headed by Ya. P. Ryabov, Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, visited Indonesia and Malaysia. The delegation also included I. T. Grishin, Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, and A. Kachanov, First Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations. In Indonesia Ryabov signed a protocol setting up a mixed Soviet-Indonesian Commission on trade and economic cooperation, promised to increase trade with Indonesia, and gave Indonesia \$60 million in credits.¹⁵⁹

In Malaysia Ryabov, the highest level Soviet ever to visit, proposed that Malaysia and the USSR establish friendship societies, a joint economic commission, and a cultural exchange program to supplement the lone 1967 Soviet-Malaysian trade agreement. Ryabov also proposed that trade with Malaysia, the USSR's most important trade partner among the ASEAN states, be increased, although he also pushed for rectification of Malaysia's large trade surplus with the USSR. Ryabov also pledged the Soviets' full support for the peace proposals made in October at the Indochinese communist foreign ministers' meeting and opposed an ASEAN suggestion that the United States play a larger role in resolving the Cambodian problem.¹⁶⁰ In early December Ryabov led a delegation to Laos to ostensibly attend an anniversary celebration but

bilateral relations were discussed, and Ryabov pledged Soviet solidarity with the "initiatives" of the communist Indochinese states regarding relations with ASEAN.¹⁶¹

(c) Details of Soviet Initiatives toward Some Individual ASEAN States During 1985

Thailand

Thailand, along with Singapore, has been the staunchest opponent of Soviet-Vietnamese militarism in the region. For that reason, Soviet overtures toward Thailand aim at defusing Thailand's (and by association, ASEAN's) resistance toward the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and toward Soviet military activities in the region. Increased overtures in 1984 were continued in 1985. Besides Zaitsev's visit to Bangkok, in September a Thai-Soviet Friendship Society delegation visited Thailand and proposed that a Thai branch be set up. In late October a USSR Supreme Soviet delegation traveled to Thailand and met with Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond and members of the Thai House of Representatives. A primary goal of the delegation, which included Minister of Trade G.I. Vashchenko, was to increase trade relations between the USSR and Thailand. The Soviet trade overtures came at a time when the United States planned decreased imports of Thai textiles. Other overtures included a proposal by the Soviet embassy in Thailand that a Thai-Soviet Chamber of Commerce be opened. Thai writers visited the USSR at Moscow's invitation.¹⁶²

In early October, however, Thailand protested against Soviet "secret" recruitment of Thai students to study in the USSR. Although Thailand had refused to accept the Soviet scholarship program, the Soviets had recruited 48 Thai students in 1984 and 73 in 1985 to study in the USSR, according to Thai security officials. The Thai Foreign Ministry estimated that as many as 200 students in 1985 may be secretly studying in the USSR. The Soviets had taken advantage of the fact that Thailand had no laws at that time forbidding individual private students from accepting foreign scholarships. The students were recruited through the Soviet embassy, using the Communist Party of Thailand, the TASS news agency, the Soviet Information Office, and a recruiting center in the northeastern province of Nakhon Phanom. The head of Thai security forces accused the Soviets of attempting to turn the students into Soviet agents.¹⁶³

In late 1985 the Thais discovered Soviet-made mines planted inside the Thai border with Cambodia. This incident produced a strong anti-Soviet reaction, with the Thai Foreign Ministry warning the Soviets against attempting to improve bilateral state-to-state relations while simultaneously supporting Vietnamese aggression.¹⁶⁴

Indonesia

In Indonesia in 1985 moves were made to implement some of the decisions and agreements on political, trade, and cultural contacts made in 1984 during Kusumaatmadja's and Wardhana's visits to the USSR. Several trade, sports and youth, parliamentary, mass media, and academic delegations visited the USSR, and Kapitsa, Ryabov, and First Deputy Chairman of the State

Committee for Foreign Economic Relations A.I. Kachanov led delegations to Indonesia. An article in Izvestiya in mid-August took a positive stance toward Soviet relations with Indonesia, praising Indonesian "support [for] many peace initiatives put forward by the Soviet Union at the United Nations and other international organizations." The article went on to point out that "There is now a growing awareness in Jakarta that the course of confrontation with the Indochinese states . . . may have dangerous consequences. Hence Indonesia's readiness, albeit demonstrated inconsistently, to hold a political dialogue with [Vietnam]." The article voices the hope that Indonesia's overtures to Vietnam will "pave the way for a broader constructive dialogue between the states of [communist] Indochina and ASEAN."¹⁶⁵

Philippines

The Philippine press reported that Soviet-sponsored subversion through labor unions and the New People's Army increased during 1985.¹⁶⁶ A Report to the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence also stated that the Soviets had increased their Soviet embassy staff in Manila for the purpose of enhancing coordination with subversive groups in the Philippines.

However, while the Soviets pursued these covert activities, they also acted in 1985 to improve state-to-state relations with the Philippines. One indication of this improvement may have been an endorsement by President Marcos as a nationalist by a pro-Soviet faction of the Philippine Communist Party (CPP), which called for change through parliamentary struggle and proclaimed the United States as the main enemy of the Philippine people. Another indication of Soviet attempts to improve relations was the warm reception Mrs. Marcos received in Moscow in March when she attended Chernenko's funeral. Mrs. Marcos, the honorary President of the Philippines-USSR Friendship Society, revisited the USSR in late October. In her meeting with Gromyko he pushed the idea of convoking the "All-Asian Forum" and expressed the hope that the USSR and the Philippines would cooperate in turning Asia and the Pacific into an area of peace.¹⁶⁷ While in the USSR she and Shevardnadze signed a cultural exchange agreement for 1985-86 and she and B.I. Aristov, Minister of Trade, discussed trade relations.

6. CONCLUSIONS

Soviet relations with ASEAN have gone through several different phases. During the first few years after the founding of ASEAN in 1967, the Soviets had little contact with ASEAN and generally attacked the organization as a tool of American imperialism in Southeast Asia. During the detente period with the United States from about 1972-1976, relations between the Soviet Union and the ASEAN countries also improved, with the Soviet Union increasing trade and other contacts and establishing diplomatic recognition of Philippines (June 1976). By late 1976, however, Soviet commentary became harsher as a result of several ASEAN initiatives to increase regional security against insurgency and in the face of the North Vietnamese takeover of South Vietnam. By 1978 this harsher commentary had given way to a standard line that, although the West and China try to include ASEAN in an anti-Soviet military alliance, the leaders of the ASEAN states resist these overtures. During this phase, lasting from 1977-78 to the present, the Soviets have taken a less negative attitude toward ASEAN but have mostly deemphasized Soviet-ASEAN

contacts, instead choosing to enhance bilateral contacts between the USSR and individual ASEAN states. The Soviets have felt that Soviet-ASEAN contacts would only serve to further legitimize ASEAN as a regional organization--an organization which, by its very existence, blocks free Soviet expansion into Southeast Asia.

During 1984-85 Soviet bilateral contacts with the ASEAN states have increased and propaganda has increasingly pushed the idea that the ASEAN states should improve relations with the Soviet Union. At the same time, Vietnam and the Soviet Union have proffered new peace initiatives in attempts to reduce ASEAN objections to the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. The subtlety of the 1984-85 Soviet propaganda campaign, deemphasizing harsh attacks against, for instance, ASEAN support for the Cambodian coalition government in exile and ASEAN support for the retention of the United Nation's seat by Democratic Kampuchea, illustrates Soviet efforts to project an image of the USSR as a reasonable, unthreatening presence in the region. Gorbachev's call for an Asian security conference, similar to Brezhnev's call for an Asian collective security system, indicates continuity in the basic Soviet orientation--that of safeguarding and advancing its influence--toward Southeast Asia. The recent Soviet propaganda campaign and bilateral overtures to the ASEAN states should be interpreted as tactical moves which do not indicate any change in the basic Soviet orientation to the region.¹⁶⁸

The Soviet Union has usually dictated, and publicly supports, the positions taken by Vietnam regarding peace overtures to ASEAN. The Soviet-Vietnamese position has consistently been that a political settlement in Southeast Asia, probably involving bilateral or even multilateral nonaggression pacts between the communist Indochinese states and the ASEAN states, is the main issue on the regional agenda. The problem of the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia is regarded as separate from and irrelevant to the goal of a political settlement in the region. Practically, though, the Soviets and Vietnamese have used the proposal to remove all Vietnamese troops from Cambodia by 1990 as an attempted means of reducing ASEAN objections to an improvement in relations.

ASEAN has publicly taken a strong, united stand against Soviet-Vietnamese aggression in Southeast Asia, although there are differences among the individual ASEAN states in their perceptions of the Soviet-Vietnamese threat. Malaysia and Indonesia, both with large, unassimilated Chinese minorities, fear Chinese-sponsored insurgency and long-term Chinese ambitions in the region. These two states have been at the forefront of diplomatic efforts to achieve a political settlement of the Cambodian problem which might allow for Vietnamese influence. Singapore and Thailand have generally taken a harder line against the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and against Soviet expansionism.

The ASEAN states are dedicated to a capitalist and democratic form of development and, by extension, ASEAN as an organization embodies and enhances the realization of these goals. The continued existence and vitality of ASEAN is perceived by the Soviets as an obstacle to the realization of Soviet objectives in the region. For this reason, Soviet policy toward ASEAN in the foreseeable future is likely to stress economic, cultural, and diplomatic relations with the individual ASEAN states rather than with the Association as a

whole. In pursuing such bilateral relations, the Soviet goals are to promote such ties at the expense of an ASEAN state's relations with other members of the Association, to isolate each member of the Association from the others, and to foster pro-Soviet orientations and policies. In addition, while the Soviets pursue such a policy through state-to-state relations, they undoubtedly act through clandestine means to subvert the states of the region. Soviet propagandists will continue to try to sow dissension among the ASEAN states on the issues of ASEAN policy toward the Cambodian problem, toward the Chinese threat, and toward the issue of "foreign bases" in the ASEAN states. The Soviets will continue to urge the ASEAN states to declare the region a nuclear-free zone. The long-term goal of the Soviet Union is to ally the ASEAN states with the Soviet Union under some kind of anti-Western, anti-Chinese regional collective security arrangement.

Appendix

Soviet Trade With the Individual ASEAN States (million rubles)

<u>Country</u>		<u>1980</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>
Indonesia	ex.	15.0	34.1	34.4	22.2	5.6
	im.	44.9	59.0	19.4	36.1	51.3
Malaysia	ex.	14.2	15.0	15.9	12.0	14.0
	im.	193.3	175.0	234.7	247.2	214.8
Singapore	ex.	14.9	49.0	30.6	23.2	24.3
	im.	68.4	68.2	40.8	65.6	203.1
Thailand	ex.	8.6	8.0	8.9	7.8	11.3
	im.	164.5	312.4	132.9	54.7	62.6
Philippines	ex.	8.5	0.5	13.1	5.6	4.7
	im.	125.7	157.0	80.5	55.0	57.9

[Sources: "Aziya," Vneshnyaya trgovlya SSSR v 1983g.: Statisticheskii sbornik (Moscow: Finance and Statistics, 1985), pp. 197-241; "Aziya," Vneshnyaya trgovlya SSSR v 1983g.: Statisticheskii sbornik (Moscow: Finance and Statistics, 1984), pp. 198-243; "Aziya," Vneshnyaya trgovlya SSSR v 1981g.: Statisticheskii sbornik (Moscow: Finance and Statistics, 1982), pp. 198-242.]

Note: Export figures are for Soviet exports to the ASEAN states; import figures are for Soviet imports from the ASEAN states. From Malaysia the USSR imports a great deal of natural rubber and also quite a bit of palm oil. In 1981-1983 Soviet imports of Thai rice greatly declined while imports of Malaysian rubber and palm oil increased.

NOTES

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⁴"Declaration of ASEAN Concord," Preamble, point 1, reproduced in Broinowski, ed., pp. 278-282.

⁵Irvine, pp. 44-46.

⁶Sheldon W. Simon, The ASEAN States and Regional Security (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), p. 9.

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⁹Donald S. Zagoria and Sheldon W. Simon, "Soviet Policy in Southeast Asia," in Donald S. Zagoria, ed., Soviet Policy in East Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 161-62; H. M. F. Howarth, "ASEAN Perceptions of Vietnam," International Defense Review, vol. 16, no. 7 (1983), pp. 925-26.

¹⁰Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "Strategic Implications of the Indochina Conflict: Thai Perspectives," Asian Affairs (Fall 1984), pp. 28-46. Paribatra relates that right after World War II Thais were sympathetic toward the Vietminh forces fighting the French in Vietnam, but that as the Vietminh advanced toward Luang Prabang "the fear of Vietnam reemerged." He maintains that Vietminh military successes "were one of the factors inducing Thailand to align itself with the US" (p. 31).

¹¹Deborah Diamond, "Sino-Soviet Rivalry in the Asian Pacific," Journal of Defense and Diplomacy, vol. 2, no. 12 (December 1984), p. 27.

¹²Paribatra, p. 32.

¹³Edward E. Masters, "ASEAN: Area of Challenge and Opportunity," in Jackson and Soesastro, p. 6. On Vietnamese economic and military dependence on the Soviet Union, see also Paul Kelemen, "Soviet Strategy in Southeast Asia: The Vietnam Factor," Asian Survey, vol. XXIV, no. 3 (March 1984), pp. 335-48. According to Soviet Military Power 1985 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, April 1985), p. 131, from 1978 through 1984 the Soviets provided over \$5 billion in arms aid to Vietnam, and "more than \$4 billion in Soviet economic assistance through 1983."

¹⁴Masters, pp. 6-7.

¹⁵Details concerning the formation and activities of the Green Star Communist Party may be found in Clark D. Neher, "Thailand," in Richard F. Staar, ed., 1984 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, Hoover Institution Press, 1984), p. 279; Paribatra, p. 34; he is citing the study by Kramol Tongdhamchart, Kusuma Snitwongse, Sarasin Viraphol, Arong Suthasasna, Wiwat Mungkandi, and Sukhumbhand Paribatra, The Thai Elite's National Security Perspectives: Implications for Southeast Asia (Bangkok: Institute of Security and International Studies, forthcoming).

¹⁶On Soviet support for the CPP-ML, see the testimony of Stanislav Levchenko, in Soviet Active Measures, Hearings Before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, 97th Congress, 2nd Session (13-14 July 1982), p. 166. On the activities of the CPP-ML and the PKP, see Leif Rosenberger, "Philippines," in Richard F. Staar, ed., Yearbook on International Communist Affairs (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1985), pp. 228-32.

¹⁷The Conference of the Youth and Students of Southeast Asia Fighting for Freedom and Independence, sponsored jointly by the Soviet-backed World Federation of Democratic Youth and the International Union of Students, was held 19-28 February 1948. The Conference resolution called for violent struggle: "Youth must unite firmly with the exploited masses in the common struggle. . . it must expose and fight the compromising policy of the right-wing leadership." According to Brimmell, the call for struggle made by Zhdanov at the opening session of the Cominform and the settlements made at the Youth Conference launched the "wave of violence which swept through India and Southeast Asia in the next few months." See Jack Henry Brimmell, Communism in Southeast Asia: A Political Analysis (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 255-63. See also the discussion of the Youth Conference and its links to communist insurrection in Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines, as set forth in Charles B. McLane, Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia: An Exploration of Eastern Policy Under Lenin and Stalin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 357-432. McLane maintains that the Youth Conference did not serve as a Soviet forum for instructing the Southeast Asian communist parties to begin revolutions. According to McLane, national liberation rhetoric at the Conference did, however, "quicken[] perceptively the tempo of all revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia" (p. 360).

¹⁸Brimmell, Ch. XXI, "The Communist Parties of Southeast Asia in the Transition to Peaceful Coexistence," pp. 294-344; Thomas T. Hammond, "The History of Communist Takeovers," in Thomas T. Hammond, ed., The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), pp. 33-35.

¹⁹Dennis J. Duncanson, "Vietnam: From Bolshevism to Peoples' War," in Hammond, ed., pp. 6-7.

²⁰Pranee Saipiroon, ASEAN Government's Attitudes Toward Regional Security 1975-1979 (Bangkok: Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, January 1982), pp. 22-28.

²¹This list of objectives draws partly on Donald S. Zagoria, "Soviet Policy in Southeast Asia," paper prepared for the US-ASEAN Conference on Economic, Political, and Security Issues in Southeast Asia in the 1980's, 2-5 November 1981, p. 10. See also the discussion of Soviet objectives in Walter J. Stossel, Jr., Allied Responses to the Soviet Challenge in East Asia and the Pacific, Current Policy #403 (Washington, DC: Bureau of Public Affairs, US Department of State, 10 June 1982), pp. 1-4.

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²⁴V. V. Samoylenko, ASEAN: Gosudarstvo i ekonomika (ASEAN: Government and Economics) (Moscow: Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury izdatel'stva "Nauka," 1982), p. 39.

²⁵Khaldin, p. 45.

²⁶A. A. Gromyko, Chief Editor, "Association of Southeast Asian Nations," Diplomaticeskii slovar' (Diplomatic Dictionary), vol. 1, (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka," 1984), p. 99.

²⁷A. G. Noorani, "Soviet Ambitions in South Asia," International Security, vol. 4, no. 3 (Winter 1979), p. 42.

²⁸V. Matveyev, "Columnists Opinions: Stuffed 'Vacuum,'" Izvestiya (29 May 1969), p. 3.

²⁹Prof. M. Kapitsa, "Collective Security System for Asia," Soviet Land, vol. 23, nos. 23-24 (December 1970), p. 6).

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81"Expulsion of Soviet Diplomat," Asian Recorder, 12-18 March 1982, p. 16503.

82M. Yelin, "The Indochina Countries' Struggles to Create a Zone of Peace in Southeast Asia," Far Eastern Affairs, no. 2 (1983), p. 154.

⁸³For details of the proposals put forth at the 5th and 6th conferences of the Indochinese Foreign Ministers, see Karl D. Jackson, "Indochina: War Without End," in Jackson and Soesastro, eds., p. 239. In September Laotian Foreign Minister Phoune Sipaseuth sent a revised form of these proposals to the 5 ASEAN Foreign Ministers. As Jackson correctly points out, "Accepting the . . . proposals would mean recognizing the right of Vietnam to invade Kampuchea, change its government, station Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea. . . these proposals are tantamount to requesting that ASEAN. . . recognize the legitimacy of Vietnamese suzerainty over [Kampuchea]" (p. 241).

⁸⁴Moscow in Vietnamese to Vietnam, 1000 GMT, 14 March 1982. For an earlier statement on the theme that Vietnam is a bulwark against "Chinese expansionism and US imperialist penetration," see Kirill Yuriev, "Why They Want a Coalition of Has-Beens," New Times, no. 1 (January 1982), pp. 10-11.

⁸⁵Sergey Bulantsev, Moscow TASS in English, 1435 GMT, 26 March 1982.

⁸⁶For an account of the visit of the Soviet delegation, headed by Mikhail Gorbachev, Politburo member, to attend the 5th Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party, and an account of Gorbachev's speech, see FBIS: Soviet Union: Daily Report, 29 March 1982, pp. E1-6.

⁸⁷Yu. Kovalenko, "International Review: US-ASEAN Escalation of the Dangerous 'Presence'," Izvestiya, 26 April 1982, p. 3.

⁸⁸Aleksandr Fedonin, Moscow World Service in English, 2100 GMT, 18 June 1982; Leonid Kuznetsov, "Stronger Voice," Pravda, 25 June 1982, p. 5. For a Western report of the meeting, see "ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meet," Asian Recorder, 9-15 July 1982, p. 16392-93.

⁸⁹Mikhail Yakovlev, Moscow TASS in English, 1906 GMT, 22 June 1982.

⁹⁰B. Vasilyev, "Provocations Against People's Kampuchea," Izvestiya, 1 July 1982, p. 5.

⁹¹Vsevolod Ovchinnikov, "Southeast Asia: Seat of Confrontation or Zone of Peace," Pravda, 25 July 1982, p. 5.

⁹²Vsevolod Ovchinnikov, "Our Commentaries: The Barker from Seoul," Pravda, 9 August 1982, p. 5.

⁹³Yu. Kovalenko, "International Review: ASEAN Paths of Cooperation and Blind Alleys of Confrontation," Izvestiya, 9 August 1982, p. 4.

⁹⁴D. Kozyrev, "US-Southeast Asia: Gambling on 'Partners'," Pravda, 7 September 1982, p. 4; Moscow TASS in English, 0503 GMT, 7 September 1982; Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, 1300 GMT, 17 September 1982; V. Ganshin, "Unseemly Attempts," Izvestiya, 23 September 1982, p. 4.

⁹⁵Vsevolod Ovchinnikov, "Commentator's Column: Journey with an Aim," Pravda, 12 November 1982, p. 5; A. Golts, "Observer's Notes: Where ASEAN is Being Dragged," Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), 14 November 1982, p. 3; V. Kalinin, "Pentagon Tour of Inspection: US Defense Secretary's Trip," Pravda, 9 November 1982, p. 5.

96Yuriy Kuznetsov, Moscow in Thai to Thailand, 1100 GMT, 11 November 1982; see also the same themes in Tashkent International Service in Uzbek, 1700 GMT, 10 November 1982.

97T. Kolesnichenko and A. Tolkunov, "For Good-Neighborliness in Southeast Asia: At the 37th UN General Assembly Session," Pravda, 11 November 1982, p. 5; "A Dialogue is Necessary," Sovetskaya Rossiya (Soviet Russia), 16 November 1982, p. 4.

98FBIS: Asia and the Pacific: Daily Report, 2 August 1982, as cited in Sino-Soviet Competition in Asia: A Chronology, 1 July-31 December 1982 (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, DDB-2200-231-84, June 1984), p. 243. (U)

99Yelin, p. 156.

100Yu. Kovalenko, "Letter from Manila: Justified Alarm," Izvestiya, 10 January 1983, p. 5.

101Yu. Bandura, "ASEAN: Collision with an 'Aircraft Carrier'," Izvestiya, 1 February 1983, p. 5.

102Colonel D. Belskiy, "International Notes: ASEAN Mythical and Real Dangers," Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), 18 January 1983, p. 3. See also Vasiliy Kharkov, Moscow TASS in English, 1705 GMT, 17 March 1983, p. 3.

103D. Kosyrev, "International Notes: Assurances and Reality," Pravda, 29 March 1983, p. 5.

104Vasiliy Alekseyev, Moscow in Japanese to Japan, 1200 GMT, 30 April 1983.

105Vladimir Kudryavtsev, "Political Observer's Opinion: Too Preoccupied with the Past, Perhaps?" Izvestiya, 6 May 1983, p. 5.

106Igor Vykhuhalev, Moscow in Japanese to Japan, 1200 GMT, 10 May 1983; see also Yevgeniy Rusakov, "Commentator's Column: Smacking of the Past," Pravda, 12 May 1983, p. 5; Sergey Bulantsev, "Fact and Fiction: Which Way is the 'Aircraft Carrier' Heading?" Sovetskaya Rossiya (Soviet Russia), 27 April 1983, p. 5.

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108V. Ganshin, "International Commentary: Southeast Asia: They are Forcing Confrontation," Izvestiya, 1 April 1983, p. 4; Vsevolod Kalinin, Moscow TASS in English, 0625 GMT, 3 April 1983.

109SWB/FE, 7 April 1983, as cited in Sino-Soviet Competition in Asia: A Chronology, 1 January-30 June 1983, p. 242.

110FBIS: Asia and the Pacific: Daily Report, 17 September 1983.

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129Alex Alexeyev, "A Dangerous Customer for Singapore's Docks," Moscow in Indonesian to Indonesia, 1330 GMT, 10 January 1984.

130Vsevolod Kalinin, "Our Commentary: Steps by the Six," Pravda, 16 January 1984, p. 5.

131Petr Alyoshin, Moscow World Service in English, 1531 GMT, 22 January 1984.

132Yevgeniy Kachanov and Boris Andianov, "International Diary," Moscow Domestic Service, 1030 GMT, 29 February 1984.

133Lt-Col. B. Viktorov, "Where are They Pushing ASEAN?," Krasnaya Vezda (Red Star), 13 March 1984, p. 3; the V. Shurygin article repeats these themes. See V. Shurygin, "ASEAN: Pressure Increased On US Policy in Southeast Asia," Pravda, 11 March 1984, p. 6.

134G. Grammatchikov, "Following the Correct Course: The Constructive Position of Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea," Krasnaya Vezda (Red Star), 2 August 1984, p. 3.

135Station Commentary, Moscow in Vietnamese to Vietnam, 1000 GMT, 25 March 1984.

136Ivan Lidin, Moscow World Service in English, 1431 GMT, 8 May 1984; see also Valery Andreyev, "Shift in Accents," New Times, no. 24 (June 1985), p. 21. There was some controversy surrounding Gromyko's position regarding the Kampuchean question. The New York Times reported that Gromyko and Mochtar had agreed to an initiative for a political settlement in Kampuchea. However, Mochtar denied this interpretation, stating instead that Gromyko had merely voiced his appreciation of Indonesia's (and ASEAN's) position regarding the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea. Mochtar reported that Gromyko voiced support for the existing Vietnamese occupation. See Robert Trumbull, "Indonesian Says Soviet Supports Cambodia Plan," New York Times, 23 April 1984, p. A4; "No Soviet Backing, says Mochtar," ASEAN Defence Journal, June

1984, p. 7. For a summary of Mochtar's talk with Gromyko, see "Foreign Minister's Visit to USSR," Asian Recorder, 20-26 May 1984, p. 17758.

¹³⁷Oleg Alekseyev, "US Militaristic Diplomacy in Southeast Asia," Moscow in Indonesian to Indonesia, 1330 GMT, 17 April 1984; Anatoliy Aleksandrov, Moscow in Indonesian to Indonesia, 1330 GMT, 10 May 1984; Aleksandr Fedonin, Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, 1800 GMT, 11 May 1984.

¹³⁸Fedonin, 11 May 1984.

¹³⁹"ASEAN," Asia 1985 Yearbook (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, Ltd., 1985), p. 94.

¹⁴⁰Nikolay Turkatenko, Moscow TASS International Service in Russian, 1245 GMT, 4 July 1984; Ryabovtsev, "ASEAN Nations in the US Plan of Aggression," Moscow in Mandarin to Southeast Asia, 1130 GMT, 4 July 1984; Vladimir Tsvetov, Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, 1500 GMT, 5 July 1984; Georgiy Zubkov, "International Panorama," Moscow Television Service in Russian, 1400 GMT, 8 July 1984; Farid Seyful-Mulyakov, "The World Today," Moscow Television Service in Russian, 1445 GMT, 10 July 1984; and Farid Seyful-Mulyakov, "World Today," Moscow Television Service in Russian, 1825 GMT, 19 July 1984; Vladimir Beloshapko, Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, 1900 GMT, 11 July 1984; Vsevolod Ovchinnikov, "International Panorama," Moscow Television Service in Russian, 1400 GMT, 22 July 1984; Vsevolod Ovchinnikov, "Vremya (Times)," Moscow Television Service in Russian, 1430 GMT, 24 July 1984; Vsevolod Ovchinnikov, "They are Fastened to the Harness," Pravda, 26 July 1984, p. 4; Pavel Demchenko, "International Review: Rebuffing Militarist Plans," Pravda, 22 July 1984, p. 4; Vikentiy Matveyev, "Political Observer's Opinion: The 'Diplomacy' of Incitement," Izvestiya, 25 July 1984, p. 5; on 26 July 1984 Ovchinnikov asserted that the US wanted to use the ASEAN states as launch platforms for forward-based nuclear weapons and that the US wanted to turn ASEAN into a US military alliance; however this assertion was explicitly repudiated by the US State Department. See International Herald Tribune, 27 July 1984, p. 1.

¹⁴¹SWB/FE/7730/A2/4, 24 August 1984.

¹⁴²Moscow TASS in English, 1150 GMT, 10 October 1984.

¹⁴³Bangkok Post, 26 September 1984.

¹⁴⁴V. Andreyev, "On Topical Subjects: USSR-Indonesia: Cooperation Prospects," Izvestiya, 13 October 1984, p. 5.

¹⁴⁵Vsevolod Kalinin, "Commentator's Column: On the Footing of Equality," Pravda, 11 December 1984, p. 5.

¹⁴⁶"Foreign Ministers Unveil New Formula for Cambodian Settlement," FBIS Trends, 24 January 1985, pp. 9-11. (U/FOUO)

¹⁴⁷"Two Plans," Asiaweek, 14 June 1985, pp. 29-34.

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